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I. INTRODUCTION
American corporations annually distribute billions of dollars I in
dividends. 2 The average individual stockholder participating in this
largesse pockets his dividend with the assumption that the federal in-
come tax authorities will demand their share. Ordinarily, he is not
disappointed, but in a large number of cases 8 the stockholder will learn,
often to his surprise, that part or even all of the dividend received by
him has been ruled by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to be a
return of capital and hence non-taxable. 4 If the stockholder asks for
an explanation of why the dividend is not a "dividend," he is generally
told that it represents, in whole or in part, a return of capital, or that
it represents a distribution out of earnings or profits accumulated before
March I, I913,1 and that under the law, distributions out of such a
tB. C. S, 192!, New York University; LL. B, 1927, St. Lawrence University;
.Lecturer in Law, New York University Law School; author, SectLion 1o and Per-
sonal Holding Company Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (1939) 49 YA.
L. J. 171; Canada's Income Tax Law (1934) 12 T. M. 588; member of the New
York Bar.
i. For z938, dividends paid by industrial corporations (other than stock divi-
dends) amounted to approximately $5,ooo,oooooo. Statistics of Income for 1938,
Treasury Department Press Release, February 26, x94z.
2. Throughout this article the term "dividend" will be enclosed in quotation marks
wherever it is used in the technical sense of the income tax law. Where not so
enclosed, the term is to be given its commonly accepted meaning.
3. Prentice-Hall, Inc. and Sinclair, Murray & Co., Inc., both of New York.
publish lists of publicly owned companies whose dividends are ruled to be partly or
entirely non-taxable.
4. This boon is not entirely without price. The exempt portion of the dividend
must be applied in reduction of the stockholder's basis for his stock, and if in excess
of that basis, such excess must be treated as gain from the sale or exchange of prop-
erty (except that, with respect to a distribution out of increase in value of property
accrued before March 1, 1913, the excess is not taxable at all). IN'. Rv. Cone,
§ i5 (b) and (d). See p. 871 infra. This is generally a comparatively small price
for the reason that any taxable excess over basis, and the increase in gain that will
result on a sale of the stock because of the reduction in basis, will ordinarily be
taxable to individual stockholders at the advantageous rates prescribed for long-term
capital gains. INT REv. CoDE § 117 (b) and (c). Where the stockholder is an indi-
vidual (or a partnership, estate or trust), he will nearly always be glad to learn that
a particular distribution is not technically a "dividend" (whether in whole or in
part) ; but where the stockholder is another corporation, the situation will be reversed.
Eighty-five per cent of "dividends" received by one corporation from another domestic
corporation are, in effect, exempt from normal tax. INT. REwv. CoD § 26 (b). Hence,
only i5% of a "dividend" received by a corporation is taxable. Gains from the sale
or exchange of pibtperty, on the other hand, are fully taxable to a corporation; so
that a receiving corporation would prefer to have the dividend treated as a "dividend"
and to leave the basis for its investment unaffected.
5. This was the effective date of the first income tax law after the adoption of
the Sixteenth Amendment.
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source are not "dividends." Whether or not this explanation satisfies
him, he will have learned that what the distributing corporation may call
a dividend, or what the state law may call a dividend, 6 or even what
the recipient thinks of without question as a dividend, is not necessarily
a "dividend" for federal income tax purposes.7 The reasons for the
distinction are found, first, in the fact that the income tax law, not
content to rest on the common conception of a dividend, sets up its
own definition,8 and, second, in certain statutory presumptions as to the
source of a corporate distribution. Moreover, one of the terms con-
tained in the statutory definition, i. e., "earnings or profits," has never
been given precise definition and has been, up to now, a center of con-
troversy. This paper will consider, in order, these three sources of
difficulty: the statutory definition of a "dividend," the effect of the
statutory presumptions as to the source of a distribution, and the
meaning of the term "earnings or profits."
II. TuE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF A "DIvwEND"
The first income tax law enacted after the Sixteenth Amendment
to the Constitution, i. e., the 1913 law, contained no definition of the
term "dividend." It merely provided that gross income included "divi-
dends." 9 The Treasury Department ascribed to the word its com-
monly accepted import and sought to tax all corporate distributions
chargeable against corporate surplus. This position was challengedin a
series of cases, only one of which, Lyich v. Hornby,10 is of particular
significance in this discussion. Hornby was a stockholder in a lum-
ber corporation which in 1914 declared and paid a dividend. Hornby
conceded that he was taxable on that proportion of the dividend which
represented a distribution of current earnings, but he maintained that
so much of the dividend as was paid out of earnings accumulated
prior to March I, 1913 (the effective date of the 1913 income tax
law), was a return of capital which was not taxable under the 1913
6. In general, the legality of a dividend declaration under state law has no bear-
ing on the question of its status for income tax purposes.
7. As indicated by its sub-title, this article is concerned only with non-liquidating
distributions, except in so far as a liquidating distribution may affect the source of a
later non-liquidating distribution. For a discussion of liquidating distributions see
Darrell, Corporate Liquidations ind the Federal Income Tax (194I) 89 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 9O7, iufra in this issue.
8. Ir REv. CODE § iiS (a).
9. Revenue Act of Oct. 3, 1913, § II B. (The cognate provision of the present
law is § 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.)
1o. 247 U. S. 339 (x18). The other cases were: Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lewellyn.
248 U. S. 71 (I918) ; Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U. S. 221 (i918) ; Southern Pacific Co.
v. I-owe, 247 U. S. 330 (1918); Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347 (x918). These
cases are criticized, not so much for their results as for their reasoning, by Professor
Powell, Inconie from Corporate Didends (1922) 35 HAr. L. REv. 363.
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law and could not be constitutionally taxed without apportionment
according to population."1
The lower courts had sustained Hornby," 2 but the Supreme Court
rejected his argument and held that Congress could validly tax dis-
tributions out of earnings accumulated prior to 1913 and had done
so in the 1913 law. The Court stated that
"C6ngress was at liberty under the [Sixteenth] Amendment to
tax as income, without apportionment, everything that became
income, in the ordinary sense of the word, after the adoption of
the Amendment, including dividends received in the ordinary
course by a stockholder from a corporation, even though they
were extraordinary in amount and might appear upon analysis
to be a mere realization in possession of an inchoate and contin-
gent interest that the stockholder had in a surplus of corporate
assets previously existing. Dividends are the appropriate fruit
of stock ownership, are commonly reckoned as income, and are
expended as such by the stockholder without regard to whether
they are declared from the most recent earnings, or from a sur-
plus accumulated from the earnings of the past, or are based on
the increased value of the property of the corporation. The stock-
holder is, in the ordinary case, a different entity from the corpo-
ration, and Congress was at liberty to treat the dividends as com-
ing to him ab extra, and as constituting a part of his income when
they came to hand." 13
Unfortunately, the Court did not have an opportunity to express
these views until June 3, 1918. Congress had, in the meantime, in
the Act of September 8, 1916, added a proviso to the definition of
gross income which for the first time defined the term "dividendsY
The pertinent part of this definition read:
" . . the term 'dividends' . . . shall be held to mean any dis-
tribution made . . . by a corporation . . out of its earnings
or profits accrued since March 1, 1913, and payable to its share-
holders . . . 4
In enacting this definition, the legislature was apparently influenced by
the constitutional qualms engendered by the decisions of the lower
I L U. S. CoNsr. Art. x, §§ 2, 9.
12. 236 Fed. 661 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). The Circuit Court of Appeals decided
the question as one of the statutory construction rather than on constitutional grounds.
In the Supreme Court, the Hornby case was argued together with the Turrish case
and the constitutional point was apparently only pressed in the Turrish case. How-
ever, the Supreme Court's opinion indicates that the Court considered the constitu-
tional question implicit in the Hornby case also.
13. 247 U. S. 339, 344 (i9x8).
14. Revenue Act of Sept. 8, x916, § 2 (a). The remainder of the definition pro-
vided that stock dividends should be subject to tax. This portion of the definition
was held invalid in the famous 5-4 decision in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189
(1920). See p. 898 infr.
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courts in the Hornby case.15 Had the constitutional spectre been laid
to rest prior to the enactment of the 1916 law, it is quite conceivable
that the barrier against the taxation of dividends out of pre-19i3
earnings would never have been erected; in which case much litigation
and some of the confusion surrounding the determination of the status
of a corporate distribution would have been eliminated. Moreover, the
revenue of the Federal Government would have been materially in-
creased. Three times since 1916, the House of Representatives has
repented of its misbegotten generosity only to be cheated of its re-
pentance by an incorrigible Senate."'
From 1916 to 1936, a period of twenty years, the definition of a
"dividend," except for certain provisions relating only to personal serv-
ice corporations, remained virtually unchanged. The advent of the
much maligned undistributed profits surtax in 1936 was responsible
for the first expansion of the definition. This surtax was imposed on
such part of the corporation's adjusted net income as was not dis-
tributed in the form of "dividends." Under the theretofore existing
definition of a "dividend," a corporation with an earnings deficit at the
beginning of the year would perforce be unable to distribute a "divi-
dend" equal to its net income for the taxable year, for the reason that
the deficit would have to be made good before there could be any
accumulation of earnings or profits,17 and a "dividend" could be paid
only if there were earnings or profits accumulated after February 28,
1913. Accordingly, in order to afford a measure of relief to corpo-
rations with deficits at the beginning of the year, by enabling them
to obtain the. benefit of the credit for "dividends" paid in computing
the undistributed profits surtax, the definition of a "dividend" was
amended to include distributions "out of the earnings or profits of the
current taxable year (computed as of the close of the taxable year
without diminution by reason of any distribution made during the tax-
able year) without regard to the amount of the earnings or profits at
15. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339, 346 (i9i8) ; Edwards v. Douglass, 269 U. S.
204, 211-212 (1925). In the Hornby opinion, Mr. Justice Pitney speaks of the x916
provision as "a concession to the equity of stockholders granted . . .in view of
constitutional questions that had been raised in this case, in the companion case of
Lynch v. Turrish, and perhaps in other cases." The Hornby case was decided by the
District Court in Jan. 1916; and by the Circuit Court of Appeals on Sept. 4, 1916.
16. Report of Ways and Means Committee on 1928 Act, 70th Cong, ist Sess.
(192-8) 20; Report of Conference Committee orn 1932 Act, 72d Cong., ist Sess. (1932)
i5; Report of Ways and Means Committee on 1934 Act, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (x934)
15. The corresponding Senate Comr-ttee reports rejecting the House's proposal
were as follows: 1928 Act, SEN;. REP. No. 96o, 7oth Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) 12; 1932
Act, SEN. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., ist Sess. (1932) 30-31; 1934 Act, SEN. REP. No.
558, 73d Cong., 2d Se's. (1934) 36. There appears to be a common but mistaken
notion that Congress first exempted pre-1913 earnings after the Supreme Court had
told it they could be validly taxed.
17. See p. 873 infra.
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the time tie d*stribution was made." I The language beginning with
the parenthetical clause was 24ded in order to avoid the difficult prob-
lems that would be involved in a determination of the current year's
earnings up to the date of distribution. 9
The undistributed profits surtax was put to a lingering death by
the 1938 Act and ceased to be effective as to taxable years beginning
in i94o; but the 1936 amendment to the "dividend" definition was per-
mitted to remain in the law. As a consequence, the 1936 amendment
is largely an anachronism 20 as to all corporations except such as are
subject to tax by reason of not distributing their adjusted net in-
come?'1
The definition has not been altered since 1936. In the light of
the current provision, the distribution of a "dividend" can only be
effected if the corporation has either earnings or profits of the taxable
year, i. e., the corporation's taxable year,22 or earnings or profits,
accumulated since February 28, 1913, of past taxable years. Because
of the statutory presumptions next to be considered, if the corpora-
tion's earnings or profits for the taxable year equalled or exceeded
the amount of the distributions during the year it is unnecessary to
inquire into the existence of past years' earnings.23
IL THE SOURCE OF DISTRIBUTION
As indicated above, any distribution which would be commonly
denominated a dividend was taxable until Congress undertook in 1916
18. Report of Senate Finance Committee, Sus. REP. No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. (xg36) x8. The amendment failed to give relief, as had been proposed in the
House bill (Ways and Means Subcommittee report, March 26, 1936), to corporations
which had taxable net income but no earnings or profits of either the current year or
past years. (As will hereinafter be shown, taxable net income and earnings or
profits are uot the same thing and it is possible to have one without the other.)
Moreover, the amendment failed to give relief to corporations which were forbidden
by state law from paying dividends. Helvering v. Northwest Rolling Mills, 311
U. S. 46 (194i). The consent dividend provisions of §28, although intended as a
relie: measure, have been sparingly used becauxt of their complexity and possibly
unf-ir results.
ig. Such problems had arisen under the 1917 lawi, which taxed the shareholders
on certain "dividends" at rates in force during the year the dividend was earned
rather than the year of payment. Mason v. Routzahn, 275 U. S. 175 (1927) ; Edwards
v. Douglas, 269 U. S. 204 (1925). The former case held that it is the existence of earn-
ings or profits at the date of payment of the dividend rather than at the date of declara-
tion which determines the character of the distribution.
20. Of course, the provision would still make taxable a distribution out of the
current year's earnings or profits, even if there were a deficit at the beginning of the
year; but a corporation in such a situation will not often, in the absence of such a
spur as a tax on undistributed income, pay any dividends.
21. Principally, personal holding companies (INT. Rxv. CODE § 5oo) and mutual
investment companies (INT. Rnv. CODE § 362).
22. The law applicable to the taxable year of the shareholder determines the status
of the distribution as to him. The law applicable to the corporation's taxable year
determines the status of the distribution as to it. G. C. M. 18,6o2, 1937-2 CuM.
Buu.. 134.
23. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § I9.115-L
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to define the term.2' Having in 1916 enacted a definition which
excluded distributions out of earnings accumulated before March i,
1913, the legislature soon learned that it had left a loophole: A cor-
poration by declaring that a particular distribution was out of pre-1913
earnings, even though it had post-1913 earnings, could save its stock-
holders from tax.2 5 To close this loophole, the 1917 law 2 added
to the section defining a "dividend," a new subsection intended to pre-
vent the distributing corporation's designation of the source of a
distribution from affecting the tax liability of the stockholders, and
designed to force a corporation to distribute its earnings after Feb-
ruary 28, 1913 before it could dip into its earnings before that date.
This was accomplished by the enactment of a conclusive statutory
presumption to the effect that any distribution was deemed to have
been made from the most recently accumulated earnings. Later, vari-
ous other loopholes developed, notably the failure to tax distributions
out of pre-19I3 earnings even when such distributions exceeded the
basis of the stock; but these were gradually stopped .up (with one
exception) 27 by a series of amendments,28 extending over a period
of more than twenty years.
This brings us to the existing provisions 22 relating to the source
of corporate distributions. They embody two conclusive 8 0 presump-
tions:
a. Every distribution is out of earnings or profits to the extent
thereof.
24. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339 (1918).
25. SEIDMAN, LEGIsLATnE HISTORY OF FEDRx. INCOME TAX LAWS (xg38) 951
(Senate discussion).
26. Revenue Act of Oct. 3, 1917 (introduced August 6, 1917): § 1211 adding
§ 31 (b) to the 1916 Act. Distributions made between Jan. x, 1916 (the effective date
of the 1916 law) and Aug. 6, 1917 (the date specified in the x917 law) and designated
as having been made out of pre-o913 earnings, even if there were post-1913 earnings,
were exempt A. R. R. ioo, 1-2 Cum. Bu.L. ix (1922). (See also U. S. Treas. Reg.
1o3, § 19.115-3.)
27. A dis:ribution out of pre-March 1, 1913 increase in value even when it ex-
ceeds basis still enjoys complete immunity. See p. 871 infra. Prior to 1936, a dis-
tribution out of pre-1913 earnings, even when in excess of basis, was similarly
exempt; but in that year, 7 slight change in the verbiage of § ixi (d) had the effect,
in the eyes of the Treasury at least, of making any such excess taxable (like gain
from a sale). Before the 1936 Act, the subsection provided that if "any distribu-
tion . . . is not out of increase in value of property accrued before March 1, i913
and is not out of earnings or profits, then the amount of such distribution" shall
reduce basis, etc. The change consisted of substituting the word "dividend" for the
italicized words. The committee reports seem to indicate that the complete significance
of the change was not apparent to the committees. The Treasury Regulations issued
under the 1936 Act reflected the change. Compare U. S. Treas. Reg. 86 (1934 Act),
Art. 115-3, 115-4, with U. S. Treas. Reg. 94 (1936 Act), Art. 115-4.
28. 1918 Act, § 201 (b) ; 1921 Act, § 201 (b), (c) ; 1924 Act, § 201 (b), (d) ; i9,32
Act, § 1x5 (d) ; 1936 Act, §115 (d) ; 1939 Act, §214 (b) amending § i15 (d) of the
Internal Revenue Code.
29. INT. REv. CODE §ii5 (b), (d).
30. Fars v. Helvering, 71 F. (2d) 61o (C. C. A. 9th, 1934) ; Leland v. Commis-
sioner, 50 F. (2d) 523 (C. C. A. ist, 1931) ; Rheinstrom v. Commissioner, 33 F. SupP.
917 (S. D. Ohio, i94o) ; A. R. R. iooo, cited note 26 supra.
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b. Every distribution is out of the most recently accumulated
earnings or profits.
Further, they state certain rules as to the effect of tax-free dis-
tributions on the stockholder's basis for his st6ck:
i. Distributions out of pre-1913 3' earnings reduce basis and if
in excess of basis become taxable as gains from the sale of property
(in nearly all cases, capital gains). There can be no distribution of
pre-1913 earnings until post-I913 earnings have been completely ex-
hausted.
2. Distributions out of pre-1913 increase in valueS2 (whether
such increase is realized after 1913 or remains unrealized) reduce
basis, but any excess over basis does not become taxable. No distri-
bution out of this source can be made until all earnings or profits,
whether before or after March I, 1913, are distributed.
3. Distributions out of any other source, e. g. post-I9I3 increase
in value,33 depletion or depreciation reserves based on cost, paid-in
surplus, or paid-in capital, reduce basis and if in excess of basis be-
come taxable as gains from the sale of property. Once all the earn-
ings or profits (both before and after 1913) are exhausted, there is
nothing in the law to prevent the distributing corporation from ear-
marking a distribution as being.either out of class 2 or class 3 (assum-
ing the existence of sources of both classes).
Because of the conclusive presumptions mentioned above, the cor-
porate surplus,3 4 or rather the source out of which any non-liquidating
distribution may be made, may be likened to a well containing liquids
of varying specific gravities. Having the lowest specific gravity, and
hence always at the top of the well, will be the earnings and profits of
the taxable year.35 Directly below the earnings of the current year
will be the accumulated earnings and profits of all past years, back as
far as March I, 1913.36 The next lower layer consists of the earnings
3r. The exact dividing line is March 1, 1913, but for convenience the terms "pre-
1913" and "post-1913" are sometimes used herein.
32. This includes distributions out of depletion and depreciation reserves based on
March 1, 1913 values to the extent that the value of the depletable or depreciable
property on that date exceeds cost.
33. This includes distributions from x924 through 1931 out of depletion reserves
based on discovery value. See note 123 infra.
34. This is defined in Edwards v. Douglas, 269 U. S. 204 (1925), as "the net
assets of a corporation in excess of all liabilities including its capital stock." As to
the sources from which a corporation may legally pay a dividend (under local law),
see Ballantine and Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions Upon Dividends Under
Modern Corporation Laws (i935) 23 CALIF. I RE. 229.
35. In the case of a company with an accumulated operating deficit, but with
earnings or profits of the taxable year, there is in fact no surplus well; the taxable
year's earnings are suspended, so to speak, in a vacuum.
36. Where property which takes as its income tax basis its value on March 1,
1913, is sold after that date, the 1913 date may act as a catalytic agent and precipitate
earnings realized after 1913 to the lower levels of the well.
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before March 1, 1913. This third layer and the segments that may lie
below it 37 do not constitute a source out of which a "dividend" may
be paid. These lower segments need not, therefore, be stratified for
purposes of this article. The statutory presumptions forbid discrim-
inate siphoning from the well until the top three sections are exhausted.
The distribution of corporate surplus thus takes a predestined order;
the three upper levels must be completely withdrawn in order, before
the next lower layers are reached.38 Bearing these rules in mind, we
pass to a consideration of specific situations.
A. Corporations Which Have an Accumtdated Operating Deficit but
W1hich Have Earnings or Profits of the Taxable Year
As already indicated, a distribution takes its color for tax pur-
poses from the earnings 39 status of the distributing corporation. Any
distribution will be a "dividend" .to the extent that there are earnings
or profits of the year in which the distribution is made. (This means
the year of payment and not the year of dividend declaration.) The
earnings of the taxable year are determined as of the close of the year
during which the distribution is made without diminution by reason
of any distribution made during the year and without regard to the
amount of earnings at the time of distribution.40  Accordingly, even
if there are no earnings of either past years or the current year at the
time of a particular distribution, that distribution will be "a dividend"
if later in the corporation's taxable year sufficient earnings are realized
to cover the distribution. 41  If there is only one distribution during
the year and it is cbvered only in part by earnings-assuming there are
no earnings of prior years--only that part will be a dividend; 42 the
remainder will be a return of capital. If there is more than one dis-
tribution during the year, and the earnings of the taxable year are
not sufficient to cover the total distributions during the year-again
assuming there are no earnings of past years-each distribution will be
37. These will consist of the sources listed under 2 and 3 on p. 871 Supra.
38. From January i, x9g6 to August 6, 1917, the corporation could drop the
siphoning tube to whichever level it chose. See note 26 supra.
39. The full term is "earnings or profits"; but for convenience, the single word
"earnings" is sometimes used.
40. U. S. Treas. Reg. io3, § sg.r 5-i. This eliminates the difficulties inherent
in a determination of whether at [h: date of di.tribution, i. e., payment, earnings of
the taxable year exist in fact. See .Ma-son v. Routzahn, 275 U. S. 175 (1927);
Edwards v. Douglas, 269 U. S. 204 (1925); Elmhirst, 41 B. T. A. 348 (i94o) (N A),
pending before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
4t. There may be a constitutional question as to whether a distribution which is
dearly out of capital when made can become a "dividend" by virtue of subsequent
profits in the same year.
42. Thus, if the distribution amounts to $io,ooo and the earnings to $8,ooo, only
the Tatter amount will be a dividend, the remaining $2,ooo will be applied in reduction
of basis.
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taxable in the proportion that the earnings of the year bear to the
total distributions during the year.
4"
Where there is preferred as well as common stock outstanding
and distributions have been made on each class of stock, which distri-
butions, in the aggregate, exceed the earnings of the taxable year-
there being no earnings of past years-the Commissioner has ruled 44
that the earnings of the taxable year are regarded as having been first
used to pay the dividends on the preferred stock and the earnings, if
any, which remain after payment to the preferred stockholders will be
regarded as having been paid to the junior stockholders.
B. Corporations Which Have Accuomdated Earnings or Profits
of Past Years
The situation here is complicated by the necessity for distinguish-
ing between earnings accumulated prior to Marich , 1913, and those
accumulated on and after that date.45  That this is'not a simple question
is shown by the large number of cases and rulings ih which the problem
has arisen. Where a corporation is organized subsequent to March i,
1913, and does not, by reason of a tax-free reorganization, take over
the pre-1913 earnings of a predecessor company, 46 there can be no
accumulation of earnings until an operating deficit is made good.47
Ho-wever, a different rule prevails where the deficit is caused not by
operating losses but by distributions in excess of earnings. Thus, where
43. U. S. Treas. Reg. io3, § 19.I15-2. This section of the regulations cites as an
example a situation where the corporation had earnings of $30,ooo for the taxable
year, but made four quarterly distributions of $i,ooo each, i. e., an aggregate of
$6o,ooo. Thus, fifty pei cent of each quarterly distribution was out of earnings of
the taxable year. If the earnings of the taxable year are not sufficient to cover the
total distributions during the year, but there are post-1913 earnings of past years
sufficient to absorb the deficiency, all of the distributions during the year will be
"dividends." But if in such a case, the post-1913 earnings of past years are not
sufficient to cover the entire deficiency of the current year, the earnings of the past
years are used to absorb the prorated portions of the deficiency in the year of the
distribution. Thus, in the example referred to above, the corporation had $12,ooo of
post-1913 earnings at the beginning of the taxable year. The aggregate deficiency of
$3o,ooo for the year of distribution is prorated to the four quarterly distributions.
The deficiency prorated to the first distribution, $7,5oo, reduces the accumulation of
past earnings by $7,30o and the remaining $4,5oo of past earnings are applied against
the deficiency prorated to the secund distribution; $3,000 of that distribution and
p7,Soo of each of the third and fourth distributions will not be a "dividend." A stock-
holder who sold his stock between the third and fourth dividends would be taxable on
all of the first dividend and twelve-fifte-,iths of the second dividend. The buyer of
the stock would be taxable on only So% of both the third and fourth dividends. As
previously indicated, that part of each distribution which was not a "dividend" would
have to be applied in reduction of basis. See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 1og, § 30.718-4.
44. G. C. 'M. :2,122, 1939-1 Cume. Bur±. 187.
45. As heretofore indicated, only the latter can be the source of a "dividend."
46. See p. 895 infra.
47. Arthur C. Stifel, 29 B. T. A. i45 (1934); Louise G. Shorb, 22 B. T. A. 644
(A) (1931). The same rule applies to a corporation organized before I913. Hadden
v. Commissioner, 49 F. (2d) 709 (C. C. A. 2d, 193) ; Chapman v. Anderson, it F.
Supp. 913 (S. D. N. Y. 1935); J. L. Washburn, 16 B T. A. zogi (i929). Contra:
Blair v. United States, 63 Ct. Cl. '93 (1927), cited note 52 infra.
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a corporation has earned $io,ooo and distributed $12,000, the resulting
deficit of $2,ooo need not be made good before there is an earnings
accumulation. 4" The contrary interpretation would enable a corpora'
lion to make a distribution out of capital, restore the resulting impair-
ment out of subsequent earnings and then repeat the process, thus
defeating the legislative intent to tax distributions of post-1913
earnings.
While, in the case of a corporation organized after March i, 1913,
post-I913 operating losses must be less than post-1913 operating profits
before there can be an accumulation of post-1913 earnings, a somewhat
different rule applies to a corporation organized before March 1, 1913,
which possessed an earnings accumulation on that date. Suppose the
accumulated earnings on March I, 1913 amount to $2oo,ooo, and that
from March I, 1913 to December 3i; 1938 the corporation each year
suffered a net loss, such losses aggregating $125,ooo. During this
period it made no distributions. Suppose further, that in 1939 the
corporation earned $ioo,ooo and that it distributed at the beginning of-
1940, $Ioo,ooo. (It had no earnings during 1940.) What is the status
of the 194o distribution? Are there post-1913 earnings?
Viewing the period subsequent to March I, i9i3 as a unit, it is
obvious that there were no earnings during this period. Rather, there
was a deficit of $25,ooo. On the other hand, what was in fact lost
during the years from March i, 1913 through 1938 was not the earn-
ings of 194o but rather the earnings which existed on March I, 1913.
A realistic appraisal of the situation would compel the conclusion that
of the aggregate earnings of $I75,ooo existing at the time of the dis-
tribution, only $75,000 represented pre-9i13 earnings. (The remainder
of the pre-19i3 earnings had been dissipated and could hardly be dis-
tributed.) This left $100,000 of post-1913 earnings. The Supreme
Court adopted this more realistic view in Helvering v. Canfield,9 and
held that the distribution in the circumstances stated would be a "divi-
dend." The Court pointed out that although the 1913 surplus became
capital from the viewpoint of the corporation, it was not frozen iito
capital so far as the stockholders were concerned; 50 and that, although
it might have been distributed tax-free 51 before it was dissipated by
losses, the failure to distribute it subjected it to the risk of the business
and when it was lost, the loss did not serve to reduce the post-1913
earnings. In other words, the fact that March i, 1913 is a dividing
48. Stanley M. Bolster, Executor, 23 B. T. A. 347 (193i); F. W. Henninger, 21
B. T. A. 1235 (1931).
49. 291 U. S. 163 (1934). The rule of the Canfield case is incorporated in U. S.
Treas. Reg. io3. § 19.i15-3.
5o. This had been decided by Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339 (z918).
51. After January i, t96. See note 26 supra.
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line does not make the accumulated earnings on that date static. A
March I, 1913 paid-in surplus, on the other hand, -is frozen into capital
even as to the stockholders, and subsequent losses are chargeable against
future earnings in arriving at post-1913 earnings5 2 The cases thus
stand for the proposition that a loss for any particular year is chargeable
first against pre-existing carnings and only after these are exhausted
does it serve to reduce subsequent accumulations of earnings5
3
Other problems on the point of whether earnings arise before or
after March 1, 1913- will be considered under heading IV of this article.
C. Corporations Which Have Neither Accumulated Earnings Nor
.Earnings of the Taxable Year
A distribution, made after the earnings of the taxable year and the
accumulated post-19I3 earnings of prior years have been fully ex-
hausted, cannot be a "dividend."- Such a distribution may be from one
of the sources listed under 2- and 3 supra If sources of each class
exist and the distribution is not ear-marked, the Treasury will probably
assert that it is out of class 3 for the reason that any excess of distribu-
tions out of that class over basis would be taxable whereas any excess
of distributions out of class 2 over basis would not be taxable . 4 Ex-
amples of distributions out of each class follow:
Suppose a corporation which has completely distributed its earn-
ings and profits (of the current year and of past years) owns non-
depreciable property, say land, which cost it $1,ooo and which on March
1, 1913 had a value of $ioooo. A distribution of the land in kind, or
a distribution of cash against a credit to surplus account 55 representing
the pre-1913 increase in value of the land, would be out of class 2 and
would not be a "dividend." The same result would follow if the cor-
poration sold the land for $Io,o oo and distributed the proceedsY6
52. Roy J. Kinnear, 36 B. T. A. 153 (937). Contra: Blair v. U. S., 63 Ct. CL
193 (1927). The Blair case appears to be overruled by Willcuts v. Milton Dairy Co.,
275 U. S. 215 (1927).
53. Where a taxpayer asserts that a particular distribution is out of pre-1913
earnings rather than post-1913 earnings, the burden of proof, as in nearly all other
tax cases, rests on him. Faris v. Helvering, 71 F. (2d) 61o (C. C. A. 9th, i934) ;
Annie P. Kountze, 17 B. T. A. 928 (1929); G. L. Holton, Executor, 7 B. T. A. x63
(1927). See also Binzel v. Commissioner, 75 F. (2d) 989 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert.
denied, 296 U. S. 579 (1935). And, if the corporation is a foreign corporation the
question of whether it has earnings or profits will be determined by our law and not
that of the foreign country. Edward D. Untermeyer, 24 B. T. A. 9o6 (1931) ; aff'd,
59 F. (2d) 1004 -(C. C. A. 2d, 1932), cert. denicd, 287 U. S. 647 (1932).
54. See p. 871 supra.
55. A writing up of assets with a corresponding credit to surplus representing
the appreciation does not create earned surplus. (Presumably, earned surplus means
the same thing as earnings or profits.) La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256
U. S. 377 (1921).
56. I. T. 13o3, I-i Cum. Buu. 17 (1922). In Hoffman v. United States, 53 F.
(2dc) 282 (1931), it was held that the 1g92 law which was the first to specifically
exempt distributions out of pre-1913 increase in value, was merely declaratory of the
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Next, suppose the property instead of being non-depreciable were
depreciable or depletable, that the depreciated or depleted cost at Marci
1, 1913 was $i,ooo and that the value of the property on that date was
$io,ooo. A distribution charged against a depreciation or depletion
reserve based o'h the latter figure would be out of class 2 to the extent
of the excess of such depreciation or depletion over depreciation or
depletion based on cost.57
To revert to the first example, if the land in question had been
purchased subsequent to March I, 1913 for $i,ooo, were distributed
in kind, and were worth $io,ooo at the date of distribution, the distri-
bution would not be a "dividend" but would fall within.class 3; it
would be out of pOst-1913 increase in value." Similarly, a distribution
in cash against a credit to surplus representing the appreciation would
be within class 3- But, if the corporation sold the land before making
distribution, the sale would convert the post-19I3 increase in value into.
earnings and a distribution thereafter would be a "dividend" to the
extent of such earnings.
- Other distributions out of class 3 would comprise distributions
out of depletion or depreciation reserves based on cost, distributions
out of paid-in surplus, and out of amounts paid in for stock. It should
constantly be borne in mind that no distribution can be made out of the
'sources just discussed unless and until all earnings and profits have been
exhausted, either by offsetting losses or by prior distributions.
IV. TIE EANING OF "EARNINGS OR PROFITS"
We now come to the major item on the agenda of this article. By
way of emphasis, let it be repeated that before any corporate distribu-
tion can be a "dividend," the distributing corporation must possess
post-1913 earnings or profits, either of the current year (regardless of
a pre-existing deficit) or of past periods subsequent to February 28,
1913. Let it also be reiterated that all the earnings or profits, whether
before or after March I, 1913, must be distributed (although only the
latter would constitute a "dividend") before there can be a distribution
out of any other source. An ascertainment of the meaning of the term
"earnings or profits" (before as well as after March i, '19I3) is, there-
fore, of paramount importance if we are to determine the character of
a particular distribution. The problem currently takes an added sig-
nificance by reason of the fact that, under the new excess-profits tax
prior law which did not specifically exempt such distributions but did exempt earnings
"accrued" prior to March I, 1913.
57. U. S. Treas. Reg. io3, § I9.II5-6.
58. Cf. B'inzel v. CQmmissioner, supra n. 53, and see p. 9o infra.
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law,39 earnings and 60 profits are a part of equity invested capital
and may have an important effect on the amount of excess-profits tax
liability when the excess-profits credit is based on invested capital. 61
Until the Second Revenue Act of 194o, Congressional concern,
perhaps it would be more accurate to say lack of concern, as to the
meaning of earnings or profits was rarely expressed in legislation.
True, provisions had been enacted, designed to prevent the depletion of
earnings by certain liquidating distributions 02 and by certain tax-free
distributions in connection with reorganizations," in order to safe-
guard the tax on subsequent distributions; but no definition of the
term comparable to, the definition of a "dividend" was attempted. This
left the burden of exegesis to the taxpayer, the Treasury, the Board
and the courts. All were agreed that earnings or profits did not mean
the same thing as taxable net income. To take perhaps the most
obvious example of difference, the corporation's own income tax, which
is not deductible in computing taxable net income, must clearly come
off in calculating earnings, since the payment of that tax depletes the
amount available for distribution to stockholders.
While all the interested parties 'were in agreement that earnings
and taxable net income were not synonymous, the concordance stopped
there. The Treasury itself maintained opposite views at one and the
same time."4 Most of the divergent views of the Treasury, on the one
hand, and the Board and the courts, on the other, have now been har-
monized by the amendments to Section 115 of the Code added by.the
Second Revenue Act of 1940.65 These amendments, in general, merely
impress the legislative stamp of approval upon the position theretofore
taken by the Treasury. As will hereinafter be shown, the 194o amend-
ments have not solved all of the riddles encountered in ascertaining
59. Not to be confused with the "declared value excess-profits tax."
6o. In the excess profits tax law (INT. REv. CODE §718 (a) (4)), and in §§ xs
(1) and (m) of the Code (added in 1940) the conjunctive form of the term is em-
ployed. Prior to 194o, only the disjunctive form had been used in the income tax
laws, except that in the 19x8 Act the phrase appears in both forms. No one has
suggested that the use of "and" signifies any c1i-. r-cnt meaning than when "or" is
employed,
61. Even when the excess profits credit is based on average base period income
(§7x3), earnings and profits may be of importance because of required adjustments
on account of capital changes. § 713 (c) (4).
6. Discussed p. 899 infra.
63. Discussed p. 897 infra.
64. Cf. Susan .T. Freshman, 33 B. T. A. 394 (1935) and F. J. Young Corp., 35
B. T. A. 86o (1937).
65. Section 5o (a) of the second 194o Act added subsections (1) and (m) to
§ 115 of the Code. By virtue of § 5i (b) and (c) these amendments are applicable
not only to years covered by the Code (years beginning after December 31, 1938)
but to all prior years as well, except as to the tax liability for any year, which on
September 20, 1940 was pending or determined by the Board or any of the courts.
As to the validity of the retroactive feature of the amendments, cf. Wilgard Realty Co.,
43 B. T. A., No. 77, Feb. 12, 194i.
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earnings or profits, and there will continue to exist disparity of opinion
as to the meaning of the term.
A. Earnings or Profits in General
The dictionary 11 defines 'earnings" simply as wages, and, al-
though this connotes primarily compensation for labor, Congress in
employing the word "earnings" undoubtedly meant it to include the
wages of capital (dividends, interest, rents, etc.) and even of sin."7 .
The term "profits" is more comprehensive. It is defined as "the excess
of income over expenditures, as in a business, during a given period of
time." Except for the fact that it connotes the existence of a business,
the definition is wide enough to include all "earnings." It contemplates
transactions in which there is an outlay and is sufficiently broad to
embrace income 08 of every character and expenditures of every char-
acter.69 The definition also plainly envisages the real i:ation of income.
Hence, mere appreciation in value without being reduced to receipt
(through conversion into cash, other property, or a c6ntract right),
and mere decline in value 70 which has not been crystallized by sale or
other disposition, do not enter into the ordinary concept of earnings or
profits, even though the economist, the lawyer, the accountant, and the
business man who is attuned to realities, would not approve the declara-
tion of a corporate dividend without taking into account unrealized
fluctuations in the value of the company's property.?' Thus, book
entries reflecting unrealized appreciation or depreciation will not create
or deplete earnings or profits. 72  Similarly book entries transferring
earned surplus to capital stock will not reduce earnings or profits.' s
Although book entries of the kind just mentioned do not affect
earnings or profits, the general bookkeeping method employed by the
corporation does have a vital bearing on the amount of its earnings.
The company's method of accounting, if it clearly reflects income, must
be followed in arriving at its taxable net income, 4 and it has been
66. WXVs M's" COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY (5th ed.).
67. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259 (1927).
68. This would exclude capital receipts, i. e., contributions to capital.
69. In the case of a capital expenditure, it is generally accepted that it is only an
offset to the income in proportion to the exhaustion of the capital asset acquired by
the expenditure.
7o. This excludes declines in value due to physical or other exhaustion of capital
assets.
71. Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U. S. 282, 291 (1938).
72. La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U. S. 377 (1921). See also U. S.
Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.115-3, and Senate Finance Committee Report on Second Reve-
,ne Act of r940, SEN. REP. No. 2114, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 25.
73. F. J, Young Corp., 35 B. T. A. 86o (i937), aof'd ithout discussion of this
point, 103 F. (2d) 137 (1939). Chapman v. Anderson, ii F. Supp. 913 (1935).
74. INT. REv. CODE § 41, U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.41-I. I PAUL AND MERTENS,
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) § 11.13.
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uniformly held that the same method of accounting which is used for
determining taxable net income must be used in arriving at earnings
or profits. Thus, where the chargeoff method is used for deducting
bad debts in calculating income tax, the reserve method may not be
used for determining earnings or profits. 75 If the company employs
the accrual method of .accounting for fixing its taxable net income,
it may not use the cash basis in establishing, the amount of its earn-
ings, and vice versa.75
In Wells Fargo Bank v. McLaughlin 77 and in Corrine S. Kosh-
land,78 the status of certain distributions by a public utility turned
upon the adequacy of depreciation deductions. It was held that the
amounts of depreciation deducted by the corporation in fixing its in-
come tax (and allowed by the Commissioner) were conclusive in
arriving at earnings, despite the fact that the depreciation deducted
in the company's accounts, pursuant to state regulations, was much
greater.79 In each of these cases, however, it was found as a fact
that the depreciation deducted on the returns was correct. If it were
not correct, presumably a different rule would apply. Thus, in Nep-
tune Meter Co. v. Price,80 it was held that amounts erroneously
charged off by way of patent depreciation in earlier years shQuld be
restored to earnings, even though the erroneous charge6ff had been
allowed by the Commissioner in such earlier years."" It would follow
that if depreciation is inadequate, earnings will have to be adjusted
downwards.
sA
Keeping these general principles in mind, we pass to a considera-
tion of, first, the differences between taxable net income and earnings
or profits, and, second, the effect of particular transactions on earn-
ings or profits.
B. Reconcilement of Taxable Net Income and Earnings or Profits
Any attempt to stake out the boundaries of earnings and profits
must begin with a point of orientation. The book surplus is not a sat-
isfactory starting point since it will vary with the accounting method
75. Neptune Meter Co. v. Price, 98 F. (2d) 76 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) ; Benjamin
Siegel, 29 B. T. A. 1289 (1934).
76. G. C. M. 2951, VII-1 Cum.. BuL.. z6o (1928); I. T. 3253 1939-1 Cum. BUzz.
178. Cf. Hadden v. Commissioner, 49 F. (2d) 7o9.
77. 78 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935), cert. dcncd, 296 U. S. 638 (9a)-
78. 33 B. T. "A. 634 (1936).
-9. Cf. Commissioner v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co, io7 F. (2d) 155 (C. C. A. 3d,
1940.
8o. Note 75 stpra.
8r. The invested capital cases are to the same effect: e. g., J. C. Blair Co., 1i
B. T. A. 673, 681 (1928). But note the effect of § 734 of the Code, added by § xi,
Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941.
82. Presumably, the special amortization deduction now allowed by § 23 t) and
§ 124 will deplete earnings to the same extent it teduces net income.
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of the corporation and the jtrdgment of its officers and auditors. The
taxable net income, on the other hand, is a uniform standard, and
hence, thee logical point of beginning. What, then, must be added to
and what must be substracted from taxable net income to arrive at
earnings or profits?
i. Items Specifically Excluded from Gross Income by Section 22 (b)
of the Internal Revenue Code
This group will comprise (a) certain life insurance proceeds;
(b) that portion of annuities which is treated as a return of capital;
(c) property acquired by gift, bequest, or devise; (d) interest on mu-
nicipal and state bonds and on tax-exempt federal obligations; (e)
compensation for personal injuries and for sickness of employees,
whether as insurance or as damages; and (f) income from' discharge
of certain indebtedness.I' Those stockholders who are subject to tax
as individuals (including partners, fiduciaries and beneficiaries) will
want all of these items excluded from earnings. On the other hand,
incorporated stockholders (this will include certain associations) and
the corporation itself (for purposes of excess-profits tax computa-
tion) will want them included in earnings and profits. Thus, consid-
ering the corporation and- its stockholders as separate entities, their
interests may be conflicting.
(a) Life insurance proceeds: Suppose a corporation has insured
the life of one of its officers for $ioo,ooo. The officer dies and the
corporation receives the proceeds tax-free. It immediately distributes
such proceeds to its stockholders. Is the distribution a "dividend"?
If the corporation's earnings, apart from the insurance proceeds, ex-
ceed $iooooo, the distribution is clearly a dividend, 4 since every
distribution is made out of earnings to the extent thereof. But, if
there were no earnings apart from the insurance proceeds, it would
be necessary to decide whether such proceeds constituted earnings. It
has been stated by way of dictum that they do.85
Although a plausible argument may be made for the point that
life insurance proceeds should retain their immunity on passing through
83. The remaining subdivisions of § 22 (b), except possibly subdivision (7),
income exempt under treaty (which might affect a foreign corporation), would have
no bearing on the problems considered herein.
84. Cummings v. Commissioner, 73 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934); Golden,
Executrix, 39 B. T. A. 682 (i939), aff'd, 113 F. (2d) 59o (C. C. A. 3d, i94o) ; Isaac
May, 2o B. T. A. 282 (1930). The reasoning of the Cummings case has been justly
criticized, PAUL, STUDIES IN FwF.tRL TAXATION, SECOND SERIES (1938) t61-164,
but the result appears to be plainly correct.
85. Cummings v. Commissioner, 73 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. ist, 1934). In Isaac
May, 2o B. T. A. 282 (1930), where there was no evidence as to accumulated earn-
ings, the Board raised a doubt as to whether the distribution of the insurance proceeds
would be a dividend if there were no such earnings.
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the corporation, the sounder view appears to be to the contrary. The
corporation and its stockholders are separate entities and the exemp-
tion, as in the case of other exemptions, is granted to the corporation,
not to its stockholders. The corporation is not-merely a conduit; its
stockholders are not taxed on its income prior to distribution. 6 The
identity of the insurance proceeds is lost in the distribution.87 More-
over, it may be assumed that the purpose of Congress in- exempting
life insurance proceeds is to encourage such insurance for the protec-
tion of dependents or those who would be injured by the death of the
insured. The protection motive, in the case of a corporation which
takes out life insurance, is tainted by the fact that what is presumably
insured against is a loss of future profits, which, if realized, would be
taxable. Moreover, distribution by the corporation negatives the no-
tion that protection was needed, so far as the corporation, as dis-
tinguished from its shareholders, is concerned, and converts the policy
i. -) an investment rather than a protective device."' Still further, the
net premium cost of the policies,89 even though not deductible,90 ordi-
narily reduces earnings 91 and hence the teturn of the premiums and
their increment in the form of the proceeds of the policy should be
restored to earnings. 92
(b) Annuities: Where the corporation enters the entire cost of
the annuity contract on its books as an asset, reducing it annually by
that portion of the annuity which is deemed to be a return of capital
under Section 22 (b) (4), i. e., all above 3% annually of cost, the
treatment of this item for the purpose of determining earnings should
coincide with its treatment for determining taxable net income. Where,
however, the corporation charges against earnings the difference be-
tween- cost of the annuity and cash surrender value, the credits to
earned surplus will begin before the exempt portions of the annuity
equal its cost.93
86. Except in unusual situations, e. g., foreign personal holding companies.
87. PAU1, op. cit. supra note 84, at 16r.
88. This is suggested in the opinion in Cummings v. Commissioner, 73 F. (2d)
477 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
89. In the case of a policy having cash surrender value, the net premium cost
would be the difference between the net premium and the increase in cash surrender
value.
90. INT. REv. CODE § 24 (a) (4).
91. P. 888 infra.
92. Where the insurance payable by reason of death is greater because paid in
instalments, it has been held that the extra payn'ent is not taxable (Commissioner v.
Winslow, 113 F. (2d) 418 (14o) ; Commissioner v. Bartlett, 113 F. (2d) 766
(1940)), but the principles suggested in the text should not be affected in such a case.
In the case of insurance proceeds received prior to the death of the insured, the
adjustment to earnings would consift of the excess of such proceeds over the cash
surrender value at which the policy was being carried on the books. As to such
proceeds, any excess over net cost of the policy would not be exempt.
93. There do not appear to be any rulings or cases on the treatment of annuities
in fixing earnings.
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(c) Gifts, bequests and devises: In Cummings v. Commissioner,94
it is suggested by way of dictum that a gift 95 to a corporation would
constitute earnings or profits. Presumably, the same suggestion would
have been made as to a bequest or devise. From the standpoint of
sheer logic, it is difficult to support this conclusion. Although a gift,
bequest or devise may increase surplus, it is not, according to common
parlance, "earned" nor is it a profit. 96 Moreover, unlike life insurance
proceeds, such an accretion is not a substitute for lost profits. While
apart from legal considerations, a fairly good argument might be made
fof" treating distributions from any source, other than paid-in capital,
as "dividends," it does not appear that Congress intended to go so
far, since it limited "dividends" to distributions out of post-19I3
earzings or profits. Admittedly, Congress has power to tax a distri-
bution out of a gift, bequest or devise to the corporation, 7 but, as
pointed out by Mr. Paul, we must not confuse "what Congress may
constitutionally do and-what it has tried to do." Is
(d) Interest on tax-exempt bonds: No one seems to question the
propriety of including this item in earnings or profits. 99 Unlike a
gift, bequest or devise, tax-exempt interest is clearly income and there
can be little doubt that Congress intended it to be compassed by the
term "earnings or profits."
(e) Compensation for injuries or sickness: It has recently been
held oo that such income, even when received by a corporation, is
exempt by virtue of the provisions of Section 22 (b) (5). However,
for the reasons stated above with respect to life insurance proceeds,
there is no sufficiently persuasive ground for excluding such income
from earnings or profits.
(f) Income from discharge of certain indebtedness, by corpora-
tions in an unsound financial condition, pursuant to Section 22 (b)
(9) : This subsection, which was designed as a partial solution to the
94. 73 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. Ist, 1934), cited note 84 supra.
95. A gift (or a bequest or devise) must be distinguished from a contribution
to capital. The latter clearly does not become a part of earnings and profits. (Note,
however, Blair v. United States, 63 Ct. Cl. 193 (1927) and I. T. 1924, 111-1 CuM.
Buy.x. 27 (1924), both of which seem to be overruled by later decisions.) Admittedly,
it will be difficult in some cases to distinguish between gifts and contributions to
capital. See Frank B. Thompson, 42 B. T. A. 121 (1940) ; cf. Helvering v. Hutchings,
9 U. S. L. VF.K 4233 (U. S. iq9) ; Robert H. Scanlon, 42 B. T. A. 997 (594o).
96. PAUL, op. cit. supra, note 84, at 164.
97. The exemption is not complete because the distribution of the property to
the stockholders-assuming it to be not out of earnings-would have to be applied in
reduction of the basis for the stock, and, if in excess of that basis, the excess -would
be taxable as a capital gain.
98. PAUL, op. cit. supra note 84, at 161.
99. U. S. Treas. Reg. 1o3, Art. 19.1I5-3. R. M. Weyerhaueser, 33 B. T. A. 594,
597 (1935) ; Charles F. Ayer, 12 B. T. A. 284, 287 (1928).
ioo. Castner Garage, Ltd., 43 B. T. A. No. i, Dec. 4, 1940.
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problem of whether the cancellation of indebtedness gives rise to tax-
able income,101 was first added by the 1939 Act.10 2 Under certain cir-
cumstances, it permits the exclusion of the differential between the
issue price of a corporation's bonds and the price at which the cor-
poration buys in the bonds (with an appropriate adjustment for un-
amortized bond premium or bond discount), at the expense of a reduc-
tion in the basis of the corporation's assets. This situation presents
a difficult problem: Should the untaxed income be added to earnings
(or reduce the deficit), and, if so, what should be done about the en-
forced reduction of basis? As to the latter, it should be noted that
on a sale of the assets, the amount that would enter into earnings
would be the difference between the reduced basis and the proceeds of
sale,103 so that at that tbne the untaxed income, at least td the extent
of the basis reduction,104 will become part of earnings. On this prem-
ise it should be ruled that no adjustment of the -earnings account
should 'be made to reflect the increase in surplus on account of the
'debt cancellation. Such treatment would be in line with the policy,
now definitely established, of excluding gain on the sale of property
from earnings if such gain is not recognized in computing net in-
come. 105  From the viewpoint of the stockholder, the question is
probably academic, at least temporarily, for the reason that such a
corporation is unlikely to make any distribution -to its stockholders;
But from the corporation's angle, the question may be quite important
as it may affect the corporation's excess-profits tax liability.
As to cancellation of indebtedness generally, any income resulting
therefrom which is taxable should, of course, be included in earnings,
not nrerely because it operates to make available to the stockholders a
larger amount for the payment of dividends, but because it constitutes
a profit in the generally accepted sense of the word. In the case of
cancellation of indebtedness which does not produce income because
the debtor remains insolvent after the cancellation,106 there is no en-
forced reduction of basis, and unless the cancellation is reflected in
earnings at the time of release, it will never, be included therein. The
ix."On this subject, sce Darrell, Discharge of Indebtedness and the Federal
Income Tax (i-o) 53 HARv. L. REv. 977; Paul, Debt and Basis Reduction Under flu
Chandler Aet (i94o) iS TuL.E L. REv. i; Surrey, The Revenue Act of 1939 and the
Icnome Tax Trcatnwn* of Cancellation of Idcbted~rss (940) 49 Y.AE I J. 1153.
102. §215 (a).
io3. I T. R.v. CODE § 115 (1); U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.115-1Z See p. 892
infra. The same rule would apply with respect to depreciation.
io4. The reduction in basis may be smaller than the cancelled indebtedness. U. S.
Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.113 (b) (3)-.
xO5. From a realistic viewpoint, this treatment will result in an ultimate distor-
tion of earnings if the assets are never sold or are of a type that is not subject to
depreciation charges. But this inconsistency will apply to all cor.tinuing transactions
where the property received in the tax-free exchange is never sold.
io6. This is still not yet finally settled. See Paul, loc. cit. s.tpra note 101, at S.
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question will be moot so far as distributions to stockholders are con-
cerned, but excess profits tax liability" of the corporation may be vitally
affected.107
2. Other items excluded from gross income
The items discussed under the preceding heading include only
receipts or types of income .ihich are specifically excluded by Section
22 (b). There are, however, other items of receipt which are not in-
cluded in income. First, there is constitutionally exempt income, 108
if any. Second, there is realized income which is not recognized or
taxed, because of either the failure of Section 22 (a) to include it,
the provisions of Section iiS itself, or the tax-free exchange pro-
visions of Section 112 of the Code. In theory, the taxation of in-
come of the last mentioned type is merely postponed, but actually, in
many instances, it completely escapes taxation. Included in the first
group might be 109 a stock dividend of common on common." 0 The
second group would contain distributions received by A Corporation
from B Corporation which are income in the ordinary sense but
which are not "dividends" under Section Ix5, non-recognized gain
from certain exchanges, and possibly gains from dealings in the stock
of the corporation itself (treasury stock). Only the first of the items
in this second group is considered at this point.11
Suppose Corporation A owns stock in Corporation B. The lat-
ter makes a distribution which is not a "dividend," say out of B's pre-
1913 earnings. Does this distribution become part of the earnings
of A? There are sound practical reasons calling for a positive an-
swer, but Congress, in the interests of an integrzited statute has an-
swered in the negative. 12  Section 115 (1) of the Code 11  (added
by the Second Revenue Act of i94o, but effective as to earlier years
io7. It will be p5ossible for such a corporation to have earnings because the
decline in value of the corporation's assets may be unrealized; and if the corporation
is included in a consolidaied return, its deficit may affect the excess profits tax liability
of the group. U. S. Treas. Reg. iio, §33.3i (a) (20).
ioS. Interest on state and municipal bonds, although specifically excluded by
§ 22 (b) may possibly fall into the constitutionally exempt category.
io9. The recent amendment to § 19.115-7 of U. S. Treas. Reg. 1o3 is significant.
It replaces the somewhat elaborate distinction between a taxable and non-taxable
stock dividend with a single sentence which virtually repeats § 115 (f) (x) of the
Code, and presages a frontal attack on the remains of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S.
i89 (iqzo). See Rudick, Section io.? and Personal Holding Company Prmisions of
the Intenral Revcnue Code (1939) 49 YALE L. J. 171, 210-211.
imo. The effect of stock dividends (whether taxable or exempt) on earnings or
profits is discussed below under a.separate heading and is, therefore, not considered
at this point.
iii. The other two items are discussed under separate headings below.
112. The Board, even in the absence of a specific provision, had so ruled (6
members dissenting). Arthur C. James, 13 B. T. A. 764 (1928), aff'd, 49 F. (2d)
707 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
13. INT. RFv. CoDE § i15 (1), fourth sentence.
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as well) provides that where a corporation receives a distribution from
a second corporation which is not a "dividend," the amount of the
distribution, to the extent that it must be applied in reduction of basis,
is not added to earnings. (The implication is that any excess over
basis, even if not taxable, must be added to earnings.) The reason
for this provision becomes clear upon reference to the second sentence
of Section 115 (1) which provides that gain or loss on the sale or
other disposition (after February 28, 1913) of property shall increase
or decrease earnings only to the extent that such gain or loss was
recognized in computing net income. Accordingly, unless distributions
which reduce basis are excluded from the earnings of the stock-
holder corporation, there will be a double "indusion, once on receipt
and again on a sale of the stock. 1 4 The effect of the statutory pro-
vision is the same as if earnings were increased by the tax-free dis-
tribution and reduced by the enforced reduction of basis.""
3. Allowable Deductions or Credits Which Do Not Deplete Earnings
or Profits
A group of items somewhat analogous to excluded income, com-
prehends artificially created deductions or credits which are allowed
for purposes of computing taxable net income,11 6 but which do not
represent actual expenses or expenditures, i. e., there is no outlay by the
corporation for the deductions or credits represented by such items.
This group includes (a) that part of interccrporate "dividends" which
is allowed as a deduction or credit, (b) interest on certain federal obli-
gations, (c) loss carryovers, and (d) excess of percentage or discovery
depletion over depletion based on cost or other basis.
.(a) Intercorporate "dividends":* "Dividends" received by one
corporation from another domestic corporation have, in effect, been
exempt from corporate normal income tax either in whole or to a-
major degree since 1917.11? Currently, they are exempt to the extent
of 857, subject to the limitation that the credit may not exceed 85%
of the adjusted net income. The exemption is, of course, bottomed on
114. For example, suppose A Corporaticn owns stock with a basis of $i,ooo. It
receives a distribution of $5oo which it must apply in reduction of basis, reducing
the latter to $5oo. Upon sale of the stock for Si.5oo, it will have a taxable gain of
$s,ooo (which is. its real gain if the $5co distribution be counted in), all of which
must be added to earnings. Unless the Szoo distribution were excluded from earnings,
the latter would be artificially overstated by $Soo. For another example, see U. S.
Treas. Reg. o3, § 19.!15-13 (Example t).
x15. The chief criticism of this rule is that if the stock with respect to which
the distribution is made is never sold, the ultimate distribution to the stockholders of
the receiving corporation may escape the tax applicable to dividends.
116. That is, income subject to corporation normal tax.
117. HOLMES, FEDERAL TAXES (6th ed. 1925) 251.
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the desire to prevent an undue dilution of the original corporation's
earnings by successive taxes on the corporations included in a pyramid;
but once the earnings sift down to an individual stockholder, there is no
reason why they should not be taxed as "dividends," and there has
never been any question but that such exempt intercorporate "divi-
dends" must be included in earnings or profits.
(b) Interest on certain federal obligations and on obligations of
federal instrumentalities: Interest of this character, which is exempt
from normal tax, must be added back to taxable income to arrive at
earnings and profits. No question has been raised as to the propriety
of this adjustment.
(c) Loss carryover: The current law allows,118 and some of the
earlier laws allowed, a corporation to carry forward a net loss of one
year, subject to certain limitations, against the income of the next year
or of the next two years. But this deduction, which may be allowable
for computing income tax, must clearly be added back to taxable
income to arrive at earnings or profits.'1 9 Otherwise,* the same loss
would be reflected in earnings twice.
(d) Percentage or discovery depletion: The Treasury Regulations
have for many years provided 120 that in computing earnings or profits,
depletion is based only on cost or other basis, and that discovery deple-
tion 121 and percentage depletion 122 should not be taken into considera-
tion in computing earnings or profits. Hence, the excess of such deple-
tion over depletion computed on cost or other basis must be added back
to taxable net income to arrive at earnings or profits.123 This position is
now fortified by the third sentence of Section 115 (1) which provides
that where, in arriving at adjusted basis for computing gain or loss on
sale or other disposition (for purposes of ascertaining taxable net in-
1i8. INT. Ray. Cooa §§23 (s), 122.
iig. R. M. Weyerhaeuser, 33 B. T. A. 594 (935).
12o. The current provision is U. S. Treas. Reg. 1o3, .§ 19-i15-3 as amended by
T. D. 5o24, Dec. i9, I94O.
121. Currently allowed with respect to certain mines under § 114 (b) (2) and (4)
of the Code. Under some prior laws, discovery depletion was allowed with respect to
other types of mines and with respect to oil and gas wells.
122. Currently allowed with respect to oil and gas wells under § 114 (b) (3) of
the Code. The allowance of percentage depletion constitutes a needless subsidy to
the owners and lessees of oil and gas wells. The theory behind it is that it obviates
the complicated calculations necessary to ascertain depletion based on cost. However,
such calculations are required anyway, as to corporations at least, in arriving at
earnings or profits.
123. Charles F. Ayer, 12 B. T. A. 284 (1928) ; cf. Elton Hoyt, 2d., 34 B. T. A.
ioii (x936). The Ayer case was decided under the i921 Act which did not specifically
treat a distribution out of a depletion reserve based on discovery value as a return of
capital. The Hoyt case was decided under the 1928 Act which did contain a specific
provision to that effect and this accounts for the difference in result. The 1932 Act
repealed the exemption provision which was first enacted in 1924. Hence the Ayer
case is still applicable.
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come), the adjustments required differ from those proper for deter-
mining earnings or profits, the latter shall be used in computing the
increase or decrease in earnings resulting from the sale or other dis-
position. To .illustrate, suppose the corporation purchased an oil well
in 1937 for $io,ooo, that it has been allowed percentage depletion from
1937 to 194o inclusive amounting to $zooo, that depletion based on
cost would amount to $i,ooo, and that the well is sold in 194o for
$zo,ooo. The adjusted basis of the well for computing gain or loss
would be $8,ooo; .the original cost must be reduced by the depletion
allowed, i. e., $2,ooo. But in determining earnings, percentage deple-
tion, to the extent it exceeds depletion computed on cost or other basis,.
is ignored. Hence, the basis used in calculating earnings-is $9,000.
Thus, although the taxable gain is $2,ooo, the increase in earnings is
only $i,o"o. This compensates for the fact that the excess depletion
of $i,ooo never reduced earnings.
124
4. Unallowable Deductions
A converse group to that just discussed consists of expenses and
losses which are not allowed as deductions in computing taxable net
income, but which clearly deplete the income available for distributioni
to the stockholders. These items must be deducted in computing earn-
ings or profits. This group-includes (a) non-deductible income and
excess profits taxes, (b) disallowed losses, (c) non-deductible life in-
surance premiums, (d) unreasonable compensation, unallowable con-
tributions, and other disallowed expense items.
(a) Income and excess profits taxes: Such taxes, if not deducted
in arriving at taxable net income, must be deducted from the latter
figure to reach earnings.1
25
(b) Disallowed losses: This does not refer to realized losses
which are nwt recogniced under Section 112; losses of the latter type
are now specifically excluded in computing earnings by the second sen-
tence of Section ii5 (1). The caption relates only to "losses disal-
lowed or not taken into account, such as those under Section 24 (b)
[losses on sales by the corporation to a controlling stockholder] Section
Ii8 [wash sales losses], and Section -17 of the Code [disallowed cap-
124. For another example, see U. S. Treas. -Reg. 103, § 19.115-12, second Example
(-). See also Ways and Means Committee Report, H. R. REP. No. 2894, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. (i94o) 42; Senate Finance Committee Report, Sax-T. REP. No. 3002, 76th
Cong, 3d. Sess. (194o) 6o-6t.
125. The question of wtien they deplete earnings has been litigated in a number
of excess-profits tax cases, e. g., Fawcus Michine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375
(i93i) ; cf. L. S. Ayers & Co., i B. T. A. TI35 (1925). The proper rule would seem
to depend on whether the taxpayer was on the cash or accrual basis. This is the
position taken in the new excess profits tax regulations. U. S. Treas. Reg. iog,
§30.718-2. Cf. Hadden v. Commissioner, 49 F. (2d) 709 (1931).
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ital losses 126].- The quoted language is taken from the Senate Fi-
nance Committee Report. 12" The Treasury Regulations repeat the
three section numbers and state that "the mere fact that [such a loss]
is not allowed does not prevent decrease in earnings and profits by the
amount of such disallowed loss." 12*
The inclusion of wash sales losses in this category is questionable
if not erroneous. Where a *asli sales loss has been disallowed, it is
permitted to be added to the basis of the stock, purchase of which
resulted in disallowance.1 29  On a sale of the latter stock, the gain or
loss "recognized" will, therefore, take into account the disallowed loss.
Hence, unless it is excluded the first time, earnings will be depleted
twice by the same loss, and the very coordination aimed at by the sec-
ond sentence of Section 115 (I) will be destroyed. To illustrate, sup-
pose a corporation sells bonds which it owns, at a loss of $I,ooo.
Within 30 days it tepurchases the same bonds for $io,ooo. The repur-
chase will prevent allowance of the $i,obo loss, but such loss may be
tacked onto the $Io,ooo cost of the later acquisition.. If the repur-
chased bonds are later sold for $12,ooo, the recognized gain will be
$i,ooo, and in fact the net result of the series of transactions is an
actual gain of $I,ooo ($2,ooo gain on the second sale less $i,ooo loss
on the first one). However, if earnings must be depleted by the disal-
lowed loss, the net increase in earnings will be zero. Accordingly earn-
ings will be distorted to the extent of $I,ooo.'8 0
(c) Disallowed life insurance premiums: 231 The payment of
such premiums, or rather, the excess of such premiums over increase
in cash value, reduces the income available for distribution to the stock-
holders and hence should be taken into account in the determination of
earnings or profits.
(d) Disallowed compensation and other disallowed expenses:
This refers to unreasonable compensation,13 2 disallowed contribu-
tions,138 and to certain unpaid expenses and interest.134 These items,
126. Under current law, § 117 (d), this would be net short term capital loss.
Any carryover of such loss would not enter into earnings. See p. 886 supra.
127. Ss-. REP. No. 2114, 76th Cong.,.3d. Sess. (94o) 23.
128. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.15-12. Presumably, a bad debt deduction which
is disallowcd because it should have been claimed in a prior year will also fall in this
category.
129. INT. REv. CODE § 113 (a) (io).
13o. In Emhirst, 41 B. T. A. 348 (ig4o) (N A). decided without benefit of
§ 15 (I), it was apparently held that the unallowable wash sale loss depleted earnings,
but a compensating adjustment was made on sale of the reacquired stock. Elmhirst,
supra at 354.
i3i. Disallowed by INT. REv. CODE § 24 (a) (4).
132. Not allowable under I.NT. RE%. CODE §23 (a).
133. Not allowable under INT. REV. CODE § 23 (a) (2) and (q).
134. Disallowed under I-T. REv. CODE § 24 (c).
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too, deplete the income available for distribution to stockholders and
should be deducted in arriving at earnings or profits."U
C. Effect of Certain Transactibns ?n Earnings or Profits
Having considered the general nature of earnings or profits and
having attempted a reconciliation of the term with taxable net income,
there remain for discussion certain transactions which evoke additional
problems.
i. Sales or .Other Dispositions of Property Acquired Prior to
March I, 1913
As heretofore indicated, new subsections were added to Section
115 of the Code by the Second Revenue Act of i94o. The immediate
occasion for the addition of these subsections, (1) and (m), 1 36 to the
law was the enactment of the 1940 excess-profits tax law. However,
they have the effect of not only clarifying the statutory cbncept of earn-
ings or profits for purposes of determining invested capital, but also of
clearing up much of the confusion hitherto connected with the deter-
mination of what is a taxable "dividend." The new provisions do not,
as is sometimes thought, define earnings or profits, but they do, as
stated, eliminate a major part of the uncertainty that surrounded the
meaning of that term. Moreover, they are made applicable to all past
years.1
8 7
The language of Section 1i 5 (1) and (in) is forbiddingly compli-
cated. Before it begins to make sense, it must be dissected and each
part reread together with the appropriate portions of the committee
reports which attempt to explain the statute. There must also be some
knowledge of the cases. One of the reasons why the new subsections
are so complex is that they carry a double burden: to clarify the mean-
ing of earnings or profits for excess-profits tax purposes, and to clarify
that meaning for the purpose of determining whether a distribution is
a dividend.' 38 For the first purpose, it matters not whether earnings
or profits were accumulated before or after March I, 1913. But for
the second purpose, the dichotomy is sometimes vital for the reason
that a distribution out of earnings or profits accumulated after the
135. By -way of dictum, the Board in R. M. Weyerhaueser, 33 B. T. A. 594
(1935), states that taxes assessed against local benefits of a kind tending to increase
the value of the property assessed (I1.T. REv. CODE §23 (c) (4)) also deplete earn-
ings. But this statement overlooks the fact that such taxes are disallowed because
they are in the nature of capital expenditures.
136. See INT. REv. CODE § xi5 (1) (1) (2), (m) (1) (2).
137. With the exceptions noted note 65 supra. There may be some question as to
the validity of the retroactive provisions in so far as they affect liabilities of pass
years
138. Ways and Mcans Committee Report, H. R. REP. No. 2894, 76th Cong., 3d.
Sess. (1940) 41.
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dividing date is a "dividend," while a distribution out of earnings or
profits accumulated before is not a "dividend" but is rather a return
of capital to be applied in reduction of basis.
Because, for purposes of determining invested capital, it is not
necessary to make any distinction between earnings before and earn-
ings after March I, 1913, values on that date are of no consequence in
determining total earnings or' profits. Hence, the first subdivision of
the first sentence of Section 115 (1) provides, in effect, that for the
purpose of computing total earnings and profits, the gain or loss on a
sale or other disposition1 39 of property (after February 28, 193)
must be computed by using as the amount to be deducted from the
proceeds of sale, the adjusted basis 40 for computing gain, without
regard to March 1, 1913, value.
The second subdivision of the first sentence of Section Ir5 (1)
comes into play only when the status of a distribution must be deter-
mined. It states, in effect, that for the purpose of computing earn-
ings and profits after February 28, 1913, the gain or loss must be
determined by using the adjusted basis 140 for determining gain. In the
case of property acquired prior to March I, 193,141 the value of the
property on that date, if higher than adjusted cost on that date, will,
under all the income tax acts 142 be the basis for computing gain.
Thus, the effect of the subdivision is to exclude from post-I913 earn-
ings any pre-1913 increase in value.
To illustrate, suppose a non-depreciable asset cost the corporation
$i,ooo prior to 1913, that its value on March I, 1913, was $2,ooo, and
that it is sold in 1940 for $3,ooo. The taxable gain, based on a 1913
value higher than cost, is only $i,ooo, but the true gain on the trans-
action, ignoring 1913 value, is $2,oo; and subdivision (i) of the first
sentence of Section 115 (1) requires the latter amount to be added to
aggregate earnings or profits. However, if we wish to determine
post-I913 earnings or profits, subdivision (2) compels us to use the
1913 value since that is the basis for computing gain. Accordingly,
only $i,ooo of the true gain is included in post-1913 earnings. The
remaining $I,ooo constitutes that part of earnings or profits which
represents an increase in value prior to February 28, 1913.
i39: The examples in the committee reports indicate that the phrase "or other
disposition" contemplates depletion and depreciatiofi.
140. Under the law applicable to the year in which the sale or other disposition
was made.
14r. This does not necessarily include only property actually acquired by the
corporation before 1913; the corporation may be entitled or required to use the 1913
value where that constitutes the basis of a transferor.
142. Under current law, IrT. Rev. CODE § 113 (a) (14), the 1913 value, if higher
than cost, may be used only in computing gain; but from i9t6 through 1933, it might
have been used as a factor in computing gain or loss.
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It is the policy of the law to treat pre-1913 increase in value, even
if realized, jdifferently from other earnings or profits.'4 Hence, the
$i,ooo referred to at the end of the foregoing illustration must be seg-
regated. This is now accomplished by Section 115 (m) (i) which
provides that if any increase 144 in post-19I3 earnings "with respect to
any matter" would be different had the adjusted basis of the property
been determined without regard to its 1913 value, an increase reflecting
such difference (with an exception to be mentioned hereinafter) shall
be made in that part of the earnings and profits consisting of increase
in value of property accrued before March I, 1913. Applying this rule
to the illustration given, if 1913 value were ignored the increase in
earnings would be $2,ooo. The difference, therefore, between this fig-
ure and the basis required under 115 (1) (2) is $i,ooo which properly
reflects the pre-19I 3 increase in value.1
45
If the application of the rule stated in Section 115 (1) (2) or
(M) (1)146 produces a post-19I3 decrease in earnings, Section I15
(M) (2) comes into operation. In essence, it provides that if the
application of the rules mentioned results in a loss which is to be ap-
plied in reduction of post-19I3 earnings, 14 7 such loss shall be reduced
by the excess of the adjusted basis used in determining the loss, over
the adjusted basis that would be used were 1913 value to be ignored;
further, that if such reduction exceeds the loss, the latter excess shall
be added to that part of earnings represented by pre-19I 3 appreciation
in value (realized subsequent to February 28, 1913).
That the statutory convolutions produce correct results will be
apparent from the following table showing the application of the
rules contained in Section 115 (m) and the first sentence of Section
iIS (1) to all of the possible variations involved (under current law)
in a sale of property acquired prior to March I, 1913:
143. See p.' 8 7i supra.
144. INT. RFv. CODE § I 5 (M) (r) reads "increase or decrease." However, if a
decrease results from a sale or other disposition, § 115 (i)(C) does not apply;
§ 1I5 (M) (2), discussed in the succeeding paragraph of the text, comes into operation.
Hence, the word "decrease" in § uS (i) (t), taken together with the subsequent
phrase "with respect to any matter," presumably contemplates depletion or depreciation.
The phrase "or any other disposition" is apparently also intended to cover depletion
and depreciation. See note 139 inIra..
145. Another illustration is contained in U. S. Treas. Reg. 03. § 19.115-14, Ex-
ample (i). The same section, Example (2), contains an illustration involving
depreciable property.
146. See note 144 supra.
147. The statutory phrase is "earnings and profits for any period beginning after
February z8, 1913." A transactioti by a corporation reporting for the calendar year
1913 would thus be excluded.
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I. 1ooo 1,200 1,50o 300 Soo 300 200
2. 1,000 800 600 (4°°) (40o) (4oo) None
3. 1,000 800 1,500 . 5 o °  500 500 None
4- 1,000 800 goo (IOO) (ioo) (IOO) None
.. . Sec.. i15 See. iI 5
(M) (2) (M) (2)
5. 1,000 1,200 80 (200) (2o0) (2oo)* None
6. i,ooo 1,200 1,1oo None Ioo None** 100
Parentheses indicate losses. The table assumes that the prop-
erty in question is not subject to depreciation or other ad-
justment after 1913.
It will be noted that columns f and g add up to column e and
that columns d and f are always the same.-
*See. 115 (1) (2) would have produced a loss of $400.
**Sec. 115 (1) (2) would have produced a loss of $ioo.
2. Tax-free Exchanges Generally
The second sentence of Section 115 (1) provides that realized
gain or lo a on a sale or other disposition of property "shall increase
or decrease the earnings and profits to, but not beyond, the extent to
which such a realized gain or loss was recognized in computing net
income under the law applicable to the year in which such sale or
disposition was made." The raison d'etre of this provision is found
in a series of Board and court cases of which McKinney v. Commis-
sioner,'48 and F. J. Young Corp. v. Commissioner,'14 are the lead-
ing ones.' 50  In these decisions 1' which involved the status of cor-
porate distributions, the Board and the courts rejected the position
taken by the Treasury (now enacted into law) to the effect that gains
and losses from a sale or other disposition of property enter into earn-
ings or profits only to the extent that such gains or losses were rec-
148. 32 B. T. A. 450 (1935), aff'd. 87 F. (2d) 8IX (C. C. A. 1oth, 1937).
149. 35 B. T. A. 86o (I937), aff'd, 1O3 F. (2d) 137 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
15o. Other cases in the series: Dorothy W. Elmhlirst. 41 B. T. A. 348 (194O)
(N A), appeal ifow pending before tho Second Circuit Court of Appeals; W. S.
Farish, 38 B. T. A. i5o (1938), aff'd, 1O4 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939); Helen
Sperry Lea, 35 B. T. A. 243 (1937), rcv'd on other grounds, 96 F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A.
2d, x938) ; Robert McCormick, Executor, 33 B T. A. 1O46 (1936) ; Susan T. Fresh-
man, 33 B. T. A. 394 (1935); National Grocer Co., i B. T. A. 688 (1925). The last
named was an excess-profits tax case. In the Lea and McCormick cases, the point
involved was merely by way of dictum.
151. The cases are subjected to a critical analysis in PAUL, op. cit. supra note 84,
at 157-158 n., i87-189.
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ognized under the provisions of sections corresponding to Section 112
of the Code.15 2 According to the Treasury, a transaction which re-
sulted in a realized gain or loss did not affect earnings or profits if
that gain or loss was not recognized because of Section 112.
The McKinney case did not, in the technical sense, involve a gain
or loss from a sale or other disposition of property. It was con-
cerned, rather, with the amount of depletion to be deducted in ascer-
taining earnings. The-depletable property, an oil and gas lease, had
been acquired by the corporation from its sole stockholder, Ida Mc-
Kinney, in exchange for all of its capital stock, in a transaction which
was wholly tax-free under a provision of the 1924 Act corresponding
to Section 112 (b) (5) of the Code. The basis of the depletable
property to the transferor, 1da McKinney, was approximately
$28,8oo, while its value at the time of acquisition by the corpora-
tion was $247,5o0. In computing the corporation's taxabli net
income, the appropriate basis for calculating depletion was $28,800 153
(the basis of the transferor). But, claimed the stockholder, for the
purpose of determining earnings, the appropriate basis for calculat-
ing depletion was $247,500. "She rested this argument largely upon
the ground that Treasury Regulations of long standing provided, that
a distribution out of a depletion reserve based upon cost 154 was not
out of earnings. Cost, she asserted, meant cost to the corporation
and not cost to the transferor. Both the Board and the appellate
court accepted this argument, with the result that earnings were re-
duced by a larger amount of depletion, and a smaller percentage of
the distribution became taxable. While the conclusion reached in the
McKinney case has the support of logic, the practical result is unde-
sirable since it would permit escape from high surtax rates of distrib-
uted income which, but for the interposition of the corporation, would
be subject to such rates. In any event, the effect of the decision has
been nullified by the second sentence of Section 1i5 (1). It is true
that this sentence refers to a gain or loss on the sale or other dis-
position of property and a depletion deduction would not ordinarily
be treated as falling within this phrase, but the committee reports
make it plain that the McKinney case was one of the situations at
which the statute was aimed.155
i52. The Treasury's position was first clearly articulated in the regulations issued
under the 1934 Act. U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. iiS-I. This was subsequent to the
years involved in the MeKinnwy and Young cases. In the FreShnan case, the Com-
missioner took an opposite position.
153. Except that percentage depletion might have been deducted.
154. The Regulations now provide that where the property is acquired after
1913, the only depletion to be considered in ascertaining earnings is depletion based
on cost or other basis. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.115-3.
i5. Senate Finance Committee Report, SE-;. RFa. No. 21r4, 76th Cong.. 3d.
Sess. (x94o) 24: "The subsection applies regardless of the form taken by the sale or
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The Young Corporation case is also overturned by the second sen-
tence of Section I 15 (I). In that case, the distributing corporation
(Yeager) had participated in a tax-free exchange. It had surrendered
property which had a cost and basis to it of $36,ooo and had received
in exchange stock of another corporation (Empire) worth $957,000.
This exchange was tax-free under Section 112 (b) (5) of the 1928
Act; hence the gain of $92I',ooo was not recognized. The Yeager
Corporation distributed the Empire stock, and some other securities
which it owned, to its stockholders, of whom the Young Corporation
was one. The earnings of Yeager, apart from the unrecognized gain,
were not sufficient to cover the total value of the distribution; and
hence the Commissioner asserted that the distribution was a "divi-
dend" only to the extent of such earnings, the balance being applied
in reduction of basis of the Yeager stock, and that to the extent of
the excess over such basis it was taxable. (The distributee in this case
was a corporation which wanted the distribution treated in full as a
"dividend," since intercorporate dividends were then fully exempt.)
As heretofore indicated, the Board and the appellate court rejected the
Commissioner's argument and held that the gain on tax-free ex-
changes became part of earnings, even though such gain was not
recognized in the determination of taxable net income.
Although the decisions in the Young and allied cases achieve
what is, in theeyes of many, a desirable economic result, they have
been persuasively criticized as contravening Congressional intent.1 ,
Any doubt that the decisions do not accord with present intent is re-
moved by the additions to Section 115 made by the Second Revenue
Act of 194o and by the committee reports explaining such additions.1 57
The second sentence of Section H15 (1) is, of course, applicable
not only to tax-free exchanges of the type involved in the cases just
discussed, but to all exchanges in which neither gain (whether in whole
or in part) nor loss is recognized. 158 Thus, referring to Example I
under the preceding heading, 59 if we assume that the property, let
us say land, was condemned, and that the condemnation proceeds
amounted to $i,5oo, of which $1,400 was invested in other land pur-
other disposition . . ." The example which follows this statement contains virtually
the exact facts of the McKinney case. The Treasury Regulations contain the same
example. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.1x5-3.
x56. PAUL, op. cit. supra note 84, at i91-199.
157. Ways and Means Committee Report, H. R. REP. No. 2894, 76th Cong.,
3d. Sess. (1940) 40; Finance Committee Report, SE . RE. No. 2114, 76th Cong., 3d.
Sess. (194o) 23-24; Conference Report, H. R. REP. No. 3002, 76th Cong., 3d. Sess.
(194o) 6o. See also U. 5. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.115-12, first Example (i) which is
based on the facts of the Young case.
158. It would also apply to instalment sales so as to spread the gain pursuant to
§44.
i5q. See p. 892 smpra.
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suant to the provisions of Section 112 (f) of the Code, the result will
be that only the recognized gain of $Ioo, i. e., the unexpended pro-
ceeds, will enter into total earnings and into earnings ascribed to pre-
1913 increase in value. Similarly, in Example 2, if the $6oo proceeds
represented the value of. property received in an exchange the loss on
which was not recognized under Section 112, the realized loss of $400
would not deplete earnings.'1 0.
3. Tax-free Reorganizations
Suppose A Corporation which has accumulated earnings of $ioo,-
ooo transfers all of its assets to B Corporation, a newly organized
company in a tax-free reorganization. B assumes A's liabilities and
issues B's stock to the A stockholders in exchange for their A stock.
A is dissolved. Thereafter, B having neither made any profits nor
suffered any losses, makes a distribution of $5o,ooo, charging it against
paid-in surplus set up on B's books at the time of taking over the
.4 assets. Is the $5o,ooo a "dividend"?
The answer is yes. However, the solution is not the result of
any specific statutory provision, but rather of judicial development.
The statute, Section 115 (a), defines a dividend as any distribution
by a torporation to its shareholders out of its earnings, and, viewing
B as a separate juristic entity, it is difficult to say thaf B has distrib-
uted its earnings, for it has none. Nevertheless, the courts have
held that the earnings of the predecessor became earnings of the
successor, a conclusion which is justifiable in view of the fact that a
contrary rule would have imputed to Congress an intent to permit a
simple reorganization of the type described above to impede tax on
the distribution of earnings-an intent opposite to that which it obvi-
ously had. The rule, known as the Sansome doctrine, was first enun-
ciated in the case of that name,""' and is expressed by Judge Learned
Hand as follows:
".. a corporate reorganization which results in no gain or
loss under section [112 of the present law] does not toll the
company's life as a continued venture under section [115 of the
present law], and . . . what were 'earnings or profits' of the
x6o. For further examples see U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.115-12.
161. Commissioner v. Sansrme, 6o F. (2d) 931 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), reversing 22
B. T. A. 1171. The facts of the SQozsomne case are substantially the same as those in
the hypothetical case in the text. The Sansome case involved a liquidatlng dividend
which, under the 1921 Act, was taxable as an ordinary dividend to the extent of the
corporation's earnings. In United States v. Kauffmann, 62 F. (:2d) 1o45 (C. C. A. 9th,
1933), the rule was applied to a non-liquidating dividend under the 1924 Act. The
doctrine is now taken for granted. See 194o H. R. Ru., supra note 157 at 4, SMEN.
REi'., supra note 157 at 25, and note § 713 (b) (3) of the Code relating to excess-
profits tax.
896 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
original, or subsidiary, company remain, for purposes of distri-
bution, 'earnings or profits' of the successor, or parent . . ." 182
The doctrine has been extended to more complicated tax-free re-
organizations. 6  Thus, in Baker v. Commissioner,'4 where a parent
corporation consolidated five wholly owned subsidiaries into a new
company, the earnings of the new consolidated company immediately
after the consolidation consisied of the aggregate earnings of the five
old companies. And in Helen V. Crocker,16 5 it was ruled that the
doctrine was applicable where a new corporation acquired the assets of
three old corporations which apparently had different stockholders. In
Barnes v. United States,168 where the transferring corporation trans-
ferred only 6o% of its net assets to the transferee corporation, it
was held that 6o% of the transferor's earnings were projected into
the transferee.
16 7
Although there are no cases in point, cold logic would compel
the application of the same rule to deficits."" But logic is an unde-
pendable tool. Suppose B Corporation, which has accumulated earn-
ings, takes over all the assets and liabilities of A Corporation, which
has an operating deficit equal to or greater than B's earnings. (Or
suppose B had the deficit and A had the earnings.) Does this com-
pletely eliminate the earnings of B (or A) so that a distribution by
it would not be a "dividend"? Consistency would compel the conclu-
sion that it does. Yet, such consistency may produce an absurd result
and if it does, the doctrine in such a situation is not likely to be
invoked.
The foregoing discussion considers the effect on earnings of a
tax-free reorganization from the viewpoint of the corporation which
acquires assets in the reorganization without surrendering anything
other than its stock or securities. But the corporation which transfers
i62. 6o F. (2d) 931, 931 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
163. The Sansoue doctrine does not operate to make the earnings of a subsidiary
the earnings of the parent prior to distribution by the subsidiary. Harter, 30 B. T. A.
572 (1934), rev'ersed on other grounds, 79 F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; James, 13
B. T. A. 764 (1928). A 1938 amendment to § 115 (h) made it clear that on a tax-
free liquidation of a subsidiary under § 112 (b) (6), the liquidating distributions to
the parent do not deplete the subsidiary's earnings which carry over to the parent.
Senatc Finance Committee Report, SE.i. Rm-. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938)
18-9z.
164. 8o F. (2d) 813 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), affirming 28 B. T. A. 704. To the same
effect: Coudon v. Tait, 61 F. (2d) 904 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
65. 29 B. T. A. 773 (1034). Five members dissented. The majority opinion,
by way of dictum, states that if tle net result of the pooling of the old corporations'
surplu',ie wps a surplus, the fact that some of them might have had deficits would not
have prevented the distribution from being treated as a "dividend."
166. 22 F. Supp. 282 (Pa., 1938).
167. In Murchison's Estate v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 641 (1935), there ap-
peared to be a transfer to two new corporations, one of which made the distribution
in question. Presumably, the pro-rata portion of the old corporation's earnings
passing to the distributing corporation, exceeded the distribution.
z68. See note 176 supra.
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assets in a reorganization may also have a problem. A fortiori, any
earnings of the transferring corporation which are transmuted into
earnings of the acquiring company, cease to be earnings of the former.
Thus, in the Barnes case, it would presumably be ruled that 4090 of
the transferring company's earnings remained with it. Where the
transferring corporation acquires "boot" in a Section 112 (d) trans-
action and retains the "boot," the gain on the exchange will be tax-
able to the extent of that "boot" "" and only to that extent will .it
become part of earnings. If the "boot" is distributed to stockholders,
so that no part of the gain is taxable, 10 it is now clear, by virtue of
the second sentence of Section 115 (I), that the unrecognized gain
will not become part of earnings.'II
There remains for consideration tinder this heading the case- of
a tax-free reorganization which is merely a recapitalization.'" This is
covered by Section 115 (h) 73 which provides inter alia that a distribu-
tion of the corporation's securities shall not be considered a distribu-
tion of earnings if no gain was recognized to the distributee on the
receipt of such securities. Thus, if A Corporation in a tax-free recap-
italization issiues preferred and common stock in exchange for com-
mon,174 even if the exchange has the effect of capitalizing part of the
company's earnings so far as its books are concerned, there is no
diminution of earnings or profits.
4. Distributions in Stock of the Distributing Corporation (Stock
Dividends) 17
Ever since the modern income tax era began, the taxation of stock
dividends has been a controversial storm center. This is not the place
to explore the subject, but we have to recognize that the question is by
no means finally settled. 176. Under Section 115 (f) (i), the only stock
dividend which is exempt from tax is one which is constitutionally im-
mune. Apparently the only kind of stock dividend which stands a
169. INT. Ray. CoDE § 112 (d) (2). The term "boat" comprises money or property
which may not be received tax-free.
170. INT. REV. CODE § 112 (d) (i).
17r. Under § I12 (C) (2). where a stockholder receives "boot" in a reorganiza-
tion, that. part of his gain represented by the "boot" may be taxable to him as a
dividend up to the amount of his ratable share of the corporation's earnings. But, as
indicated in the text, "boot" received by a corporation and distributed to its stock-
holders does not become part of earnings.
172. § 112 (g) (1) (E).
173. Similir provisions have been contained in the revenue acts since 1924. E. g.
§203 (g) of the 1924 Act
174. For an example of such a recapitalization, see Hartzell, 4o B. T. A. 492
(1939) (A).
175. In the ensuing discussion, the term -'stock dividend" should be understood
to include rights to buy additional stock of the distributing corporation.
x76. See note io9 supra.
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chance of falling within this category is common on common. 177 Even
as to the latter type, there may be a question where both voting and
non-voting common are involved, 178 apart from the now dubious au-
thority of Eisner v. Macomber.17 9  Pending the ultimate settlement of
the question, all that can be done, so far as ascertainment of earnings
or profits is concerned, is to state that a stock dividend which is exempt
does not deplete earnings, while bne which is not exempt, does. Obvi-
ously, a stock dividend which is not treated as a "dividend" for income
tax purposes should not exhaust earnings so as to make future cash
distributions returns of capital. Section 115 (h), mentioned in the
last paragraph of the preceding heading, makes it plain that an exempt
stock dividend does not deplete earnings.18 0 It contains a provision to
the effect that a distribution which is constitutionally exempt shall not
be considered a distribution of earnings. It also provides that any dis-
tribution which was exempt under Section 1i5 (f) of the 1934 Act or
a coTresponding provision of a prior act shall not be considered a dis-
tribution of earnings. Section Ii5 (f) of the i934 Act specifically
exempted all stock dividends, as did the prior acts from 19zi on. Ac-
cordingly, any distribution of a stock dividend from I,921 through
1935 did not reduce earnings available for future distribution.""'
Where one corporation receives a non-taxable stock dividend from
another corporation, the distribution does not become part of the earn-
ings of the first corporation. This is made plain by subdivision two of
the fourth sentence of Section IJ 5 (1).112
5. Effect of Distributions in Partial Liquidation
A Corporation begins operating with an original capital of $200,-
ooo.18 3  By 1940 it has accumulated earnings-of $iooooo. In i94o
it redeems half of its stock against a cash payment of $i5o,ooo. On
177. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238 (x937); Koshland v. Helvering, 298
U. S. 441 (935) ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (x92o); Kelly Trust, 38 B. T.
A. 1014 (1938).
178. Keister, 42 B. T. A. 484 (1940). It may be possible to achieve the effect
of a stock dividend, without tax, by means of a tax-free recapitalization under
§ 112(g) (1) (E).
179. 252 U. S. 189 (ig2o), cited note iog supra.
i8o. Even before, the statute contained a specific provision, it was held that
exempt stock dividends did not reduce earnings. Walker v. Hopkins, 12 F. (2d) 262
(C. C. A. 5th, 1926); H. Y. McCord, 31 B. T. A. 338 (1934); Hugh R. Wilson, 3 B. T.
A. 957 (1926).
181. Section 115 (h) also affects certain distributions, under § 112 (g) of the
1932 Act and corresponding provisions of earlier acts back to and including I94, of
securities in connection with a reorganization, which were tax-free when made, but
which would not be tax-free under existing law. Section 15 (h) makes it clear
that such tax-free distributions did not constitute distributions of earnings.
182. In the case of non-taxable stock dividends received prior to 1936, this rule
would apply only if an allocation of the basis of the old stock between the old and
the new is required. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.115-13, Example (2).
183. It would make no difference whether this were all credited to capital stock
or part to stock and part to paid-in surplus.
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January 2, i94i, it makes a distribution of $io,ooo. Assuming that
there are no earnings for the entire year 1941, is the distribution of
January 2 a "dividend"? The solution to this question turns upon the
effect on earnings of the 194o redemption. In the absence of an im-
peding provision, a plausible argument might be made that since "every
distribution is made out of earnings or profits to the extent thereof,".; 84
the distribution made in partial liquidation 185 in 1940 more than ex-
hausted the earnings so that the 1941 distribution was out of some
other source. However, any basis for such an argument is destroyed
by the penultimate sentence of Section i 15 which provides:
"In the case of amounts distributed . . . in partial liquida-
tion 188 . . . the part of such distribution which is properly
chargeable to capital account shall not be considered a distribution
of earnings or profits."
In the illustration given, half of the stock has been redeemed,
hence the original capital should be reduced by half. This amounts to
$ioo,ooo, leaving $5o,ooo of the 194o distribution to be charged
against earnings. This procedure still leaves $5o,oo0 in the earnings
account, which would be more than sufficient to cover the 1941 distri-
bution, so that the latter is a dividend.
In Foster v. United States,1 7 it was held that the March I, 1913
earnings and increase in value before that date of a corporation are
"capital" within the meaning of Section 115 (c). In the Foster case a
portion of the company's'stock was redeemed on October IO, 1929, for
exactly its March I, 1913, value ($I,O25,ooo) which'was far in excess
of the original capital applicable to such stock ($5o,ooo). The recip-
ient of a subsequent distribution on February II, 1930, contended that
the amount properly chargeable to capital with respect to the redemp-
tion was only $5o,ooo and that the remaining $975,000 was chargeable
to the most recently accumulated earnings. Post-19I3 earnings were
less than $975,ooo. Hence, it was claimed that such earnings were
exhausted and that the subsequent distribution was a "dividend" only
to the extent of the earnings between October IO, 1929, and February
11, I93o.1' 8 The Court rejected this argument and ruled that the
plain purpose of Congress in enacting Section 115 (c) was to prevent
184. INT. REv. CODE § x iS (b).
185. INT. REV. CODE § 1i5 (i) defines "amotmts distributed in partial liquidation"
as a distribution "in complete cancellation or redemption of a part of its stock, or
one of a series of distributions in complete cancellation or redemption of all or a
portion of its stock."
186. Here follows "(other than a distribution to which the provisions of sub-
section (h) of this section are applicable)." A corresponding provision has been in
the law since 1924. SUIDMAN, op. cit. supra note 25, at 678.
187. 303 U. S. IIS (1938).
188. As pointed out on p. 874 supra, an excess of distributions over earnings does
not operate to deplete future earnings.
900 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
escape from tax on pOst-19I3 earnings, and that the accumulated earn-
ings and appreciation in value to March 1, 1913, were deemed to be
capital from the viewpoint of the corporation. 189
A very recent application of the Section 115 (c) provision now
under review is found in William D. P. Jat'is,19° where the Board
refused to extend the theory of the Foster case to post-I913 earnings
and ruled that such earnings'were not capital within the meaning of
the provision. In the Jarvis case, the corporation had been organized
after I9M3 with a capital stock of $i,ooo,ooo and a paid-in surplus of
$911,500. In 1934, it purchased afid subsequently retired one-tenth
of its total capital stock for $I,i6o,ooo. The Board'ruled that of this
distribution, $Ioo,ooo was chargeable to capital stock and $9i,i5o was
chargeable to paid-in surplus; the remainder of the $i,i6oooo was
chargeable to earnings to the extent thereof. The earnings at the time
of acquisition of the stock were not sufficient to absorb the entire
excess over the charge to capital and surplus. Hence, a subsequent dis-
tribution in 1935 was held taxable as a dividend only to the extent of
the earnings subsequent to the 1934 distribution,' 91 the balance of the
1935 distribution being chargeable to capital account.1
9 2
A redemption of stock which is ruled to be essentially the equiv-
alent of a dividend under Section ii5 (g) should, of course, lessen
earnings. Despite the fact that such a redemption would fall within
the definition of "partial liquidation" contained in Section 115 (i), the
obvious intent of the statute would be.defeated if any portion of the
redemption were charged to capital.
6. Transactions in Treasury Stock
Like the question of stock dividends, the appropriate income tax
treatment of dealings by a corporation in its own stock is still in flux.
Ilelvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,' 93 relying on the unrealistic and
unstable doctrine that legislative re-enactment in the face of admin-
istrative construction confers authoritative sanction on the adminis-
trative interpretation, merely held that where a corporation bought
i8g. Cf. the Canfield case, and Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339 (1918), which
hold that the pre-1913 earnings and increase in value are not frozen into capital so
far as the stockholder is concerned.
190. 43 B. T. A. No. 58, Jan. 29, 1941.
191. See note 188 supra.
192. Cf. Harter v. Helvering, 79 F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) and August
Iorrmann, 34 B. T. A. 1178 (r936), which the Board properly regards (in the
Jarvis case) as overruled in part by the Foster decision. In both these cases, the
company was organized prior to 1913 and under the rule of the Foster case, redemp-
tions should have been charged first to pre-1913 earnings (which had become "capital"
so far as § 115 (c) was concerned), rather than to post-1913 earnings. Where a non-
taxable stock dividend is issued, the original capital is apparently spread over the
original stock and the stock dividend in proportion to the values of each. August
Horrmann supra.
193. 306 U. S. 11o (1939).
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and sold its own stock prior to 1934, no gain or loss arose. Up to
May 2, 1934, the Treasury Regulations had held that there was no gain
or loss to, a corporation on the purchase or sale of its own stock, and
the Court simply ruled that the 1934 amendment to the regulations
purporting to make such gains and losses taxable and deductible could
not be made retroactive.' 94  Despite extensions by the lower tri-
bunals 1296 of the result in the Reynolds case to sales of treasury stock
after the date of the amendment to the regulations, it can-not be con-
sidered finally settled that a gain or loss on a sale of treasury stock
after the amendment date is to be excluded in fixing taxable net in-
come. Nor is it likely that the Court meant to overrule a case such
as Commissioner v. Woods Machine Co. 9" in which the corporation
received its own stock in settlement of a claim for patent infringement
and was required to include the value of the stock in taxable income.
Pending a solution of the problems which still cluster around
transactions involving treasury stock, no clear cut statement of the
effect of such transactions on earnings can be made. However, it
seems plain that if gains and losses on treasury stock transactions
are ultimately ruled to be components of taxable income, earnings
should be correspondingly affected. Even if such gains or losses are
excluded from taxable net income, there seems to be no persuasive
reason why they should not add to or detract from earnings. If a
corporation buys its stock at IO and sells at 2o, it has made a clear
profit of io. It would be fatuous to blind ourselves to the fact that
the accession has increased the amount available for distribution to
its stockholders. Conversely, if it sold for 5 the resulting loss would
patently have depleted the amount available for distribution. Dealings
in treasury stock, if gain or loss is not taxable or allowable, stand on
a different footing from tax-free exchanges. The unrecognized gain
or loss on the latter is postponed (except where the property received
in the exchange is never sold or exhausted), whereas there is no defer-
ment of a gain or loss on a sale of treasury stock.'9 7 Unless earnings
194. See PAUL, STUDIES m. FFr- RAL TAXATION (3d Ser. 1910) 420; Alvord,
Treasury Regruletions and Ih.- Wfil.,h're Oil Cose (19.10) 40 CoL. L. REV. 252; Brown,
Regulations, Rec,'acthnnt wid the Revenue Acts (Ig i) 54 HARV. L. REV. 377; Gris-
wold, A Summary of the Rcg:dations Problem (1941) .4 H.ARV. L. REV. 398; Surrey,
The Scope and Effect of Treasury Reynations (xg4o) ES U. oF PA. L. REV. 556.
195. In National I-ome Owners Scrvice Corp., 39 B. T. A. 753 (1939) (N A)
the Board refused to apply the a-,riMed regulation under the £934 Act; and in
National Manufacturing & Stores Corp. v. Allen, Prentice Hall, i91o Fed. Tax
Serv. 162,932 (D. C. Ga.) the court held that the earlier rtgulation had become
embedded in the statute and could not be changed even as to future years. It is hard
to see how a change in an interpretative regulation, as di-tinguishcd from a legislative
regulation such as that involved in Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 3o8 U. S. 90
(1939), can have the effect of making the same statutory language mean one thing one
day and another the next day.
1 x96. 57 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. ist, 1932), cert. dened, 287 U. S. 613 (932).
197. A gain on the sale of treasury stock, if not taxable, is excluded under an
administrative interpretation of § 22 (a) (defining gross income) rather than by virtue
of any provision of § 112.
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are affected at the time of sale of the treasury stock, they will never
be affected. Accordingly, the sounder position seems to be that gains
or losses on treasury stock, even if excluded from taxable net income,
should increase or decrease earnings.
The above discussion assumes that the mere acquisition of treas-
ury stock is not itself a distribution; and it has been so held. 198 The
new -excess-profits tax regulations 199 also assume that the mere acqui-
sition of treasury stock does not affect earnings or profits. However,
if the treasury stock is ultimately retired, it then becomes necessary
to make an appropriate adjustment to earnings. 2°
7. Distributions in Kind
It has consistently been held that unrealized increase or decrease
in value of property does not increase or lessen earnings or profits.
20 1
Suppose A Corporation has invested $io,ooo in stock of B Corpora-
tion. It distributes this stock to its (A's) stockholders at a time when
the stock is worth $ioo,ooo. Does the distribution effect a "realiza-
tion" of the $9oooo enhancement in value? If the distribution is
one in complete or partial liquidation, there is no realization to the
corporation in the income tax sense. The Treasury Regulations have
uniformly held that "no gain or loss is realized by a corporation from
the mere distribution of its assets in kind in partial or complete liqui-
dation, however they may have appreciated or depreciated in value
since their acquisition"; 202 and if the doctrine of legislative re-enact-
ment has any vitality at all, surely this provision must be embedded in
the law.
A fortiori, the sam6 rule should apply to a- distribution in kind
which is not in partial or complete liquidation. This conclusion seems
almost inescapable in view of the fact that Section 1i5 (d) contem-
plates tax-free distributions out of unrealized post-1913 increase in
i98- Villiam A. Smith, 38 B. T. A. 317 (1938); cf. John B. Stewart, 29 B. T. A.
8op (1934). In the Stewart case, an acquisition of treasury stock followed by issuance
of the stock to the remaining stockholders as a stock dividend was held to be out of
earnings, except for the amount chargeable to capital. (Three members dissented.)
To the extent that the distribution was ruled out of post-1913 earnings rather than
pre-1913 earnings, the case is considered overruled by the Foster case. See Jarvis, 43
B. T. A. No. 58, Jan. 29, 1941.
i99. U. S. Treas. Reg. 1o9, §§ 30.718-4 and 30.720-1. See also U. S. Treas. Reg.
103, § 19.!7 (d)-i: and Treas. Reg. 64, Art. 47 (a) (Capital Stock Tax). See also
Diamond Alkali Co. v. Driscoll, Prentice-Hall 194x Fed. Tax Serv. 62,475 (W. D.
Pa. 1941).
20o. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.718-4.
2o. See p. 878 supra. Note also the following stafement from the Senate Finance
Committee Report on the Second Revenue Act of 194o, SEx. RFP. No. 2114, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 25 "Of course, mere increase or decrease in value (after
February 28, 1913) of property owned by a corporation does not increase [sic] its
earnings and profits."
202. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22 (a)-2i. All prior regulations back as far as
1918 contained similar provisions, e. g., Art. 547, Reg. 45 (xix8 Act). An exception
is the distribution of an instalment obligation; § 44 (d) of the Code.
"DIVIDENDS" UNDER THE INCOME TAX LAW
value; 203 and if distribution effects realization, it would be impossible
to make a distribution out of unrealized post-1913 appreciation. This
conclusion is further fortified by the result in Gencral Utilities & Op-
erating Co. v. Helkeri4g.2 4  The Government, before the Supreme
Court, argued in that case that where a corporation pays a dividend
in property which has appreciated in value, it realizes gain.20 5  The
Court, in deciding the case against the Government, partly on pro-
cedural grounds, did not specifically allude to this argument, but at
the same time it said: "Both tribunals below rightfully decided that
[the distributing corporation] received no taxable gain from the dis-
tribution among its stockholders of the [apprecin~td property] as a
dividend. This was no sale; assets were not used to discharge indebt-
edness." 206
8. Effect of Consolidated Returns 207
Space limitations preclude any detailed discussion of the effect
of a consolidated return on the earnings status of either the consoli-
dated group or of the component companies. To illustrate the type of
problem that may be encountered, suppose Subsidary A sells property
'to Subsidiary B for cash during a consolidated return period. The
gain or loss on the sale is not recognized in determining taxable net
income and should not, therefore, affect the earnings of Subsidiary
A [Section ii5 (1)]. The unrecognized gain or loss will be picked
up'by Subsidiary B if and when that corporation sells to an outsider,
whether or not the sale to the outsider occurs during a consolidated
return period [Section 113 (a) (ii)]. This result is somewhat akin
to an application of the Sansome rule, except that the transferred
earnings (or loss), so far as the transferee is concerned, remain po-
tential rather than crystallized. Viewing the participating corpora-
,03. See p. 871 stpra; Rrport of Ways and Means Committee on 1924 Act, H. R.
REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., ist Sess. (1924) 12.
204. 296 U. S. 200 (1935).
205. In the lower tribuuals, the Government had maintained that the corporation
had declared a dividend payable in a specific am,,unt of dollars and cents and had
subsequently effected payment of the dividend with property worth far more than its
cost, so that the tran--aetion ;as the equivalent of a sale resulting in taxable gain.
The Government had conceded, in tle lower tribunals, the distinction between a divi-
dend of the kind just mentioned and a dividend declared to be payable in kind. P.Lu,
op. cit. supra, note 84, at 171.
206. Cf. Binzel v. Commissioner, 75 F. (2d) 989 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), which is
rightly characterized as a "fuzzy" decision in PAuL, op. cit. s'ipra, note 84, at 174. In
the Rincl case it -was apparently taken for granted that a distribution in appreciated
property did not realize taxable profit to the distributing corporation, but the enhance-
ment in value was nevertheless taxed to the stockholders as a dividend in the absence
of a showing that the post-igi3 earnings were insufficient to absorb the enhanced value
of the distributed property.
,o7. Under current law, only railroad corporations and certain Pan-American
trade corporations may file consolidated income tax returns. However, for excess-
profits tax purposes, any affiliated (as defined in the statute) group of corporations
is permitted to file a consolidated return.
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tions as distinctly separate entities, seemingly incongruous results may
develop, but the aggregate result will be correct.
It has been held, without conflict, that the earnings of a subsid-
iary do not become earnings of the parent corporation prior to dis-
tribution by the subsidiary.20 8 For purposes of determining the status
of a distribution, this rule may possibly be waived if a consolidated
return is filed by the two corj~orations.20 9
9. Distributions to Shareholders Who Reported Pro-rata Shares of
Income in Prior Years
Under certain provisions of current and prior laws, 210 stockhold-
ers have been permitted 211 to save their corporations from certain
taxes by including in their individual returns their pro-rata portions
of the corporation's net income. -In such situations, the earnings and
profits included in the income so reported may be withdrawn as re-
turns of capital, provided all subsequent earnings and profits are first
exhausted.2 12 Earnings so reported and left in the corporation will
be subject to depletion by a subsequent loss; 218 so that distributions
after the loss year may have to be applied against earnitligs of the




I. The second clause of Section I15 (a) of the Code, which adds
to the definition of a "dividend" any distribution out of the earnings
of the taxable year without regard to the aggregate earnings, should
208. Arthur C. James, i3 B. T. A. 764 (1928), aff'd, 49 F. (2d) 707 (C. C. A.
2d, 103 ) ; Harter, 30 B. T. A. 572 (1934), reversed on other grounds. 79 F. (2d) 12
(C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
2o9. Thus, in Merrick v. United States, Prentice-Hall x94o Tax' Serv. 162,482,
it was stipulated by the taxpayer and the Government that if one of the subsidiaries
had sustained a bad debt deduction, the distribution in question was not "out of the
consolidated earnings of [the parent] and its subsidiaries." Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg.
11o, § 33-31 (a) (2o) (relating to consolidated excess profits tax returns), which pro-
vides that the consolidated earnings at the beginning of the year shall be the excess of
the combined earnings of the constituent companies having earnings over the combined
deficit of the deficit companies.
21o. E. g. § 725 (b) and Supplement S of Chapter i of the Code (personal service
corporations) ; § 351 (d) of the 1936 Act (personal holding companies ); § 102 (d) of
the 1936 Act (unreasonable accumulation of surplus); § 28 of the 1938 Act (consent
dividends credit).
211. In some cases, the stockholders have been required to include in their indi-
vidual returns, their pro-rata shares of the corporation's net income; e. g., § 218 of
the i958 Act. Cf. § 337 (e) of the Code (foreign personal holding companies).
212. See IxT. Rev. CoDE § 1i5 (e) ; I. T. 3295, 1939-2, CUM. BUu. 243. The
subsequent earnings must first be exhausted because of the presumption contained in
§ uS (b) to the effect that all distributions are out of the most recently accumulated
earnings.
213. See p. 875 supra,.and Dorothy W. Elmhirst, 41 B. T. A. 348 (194o).
214. Dorothy \V. Elmhirst, 41 B. T. A. 348 (194o).
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be deleted. The undistributed profits tax which begot the clause is
now relegated to limbo, so that the clause itself is now anachronistic.
225
As a matter of fairness, a stockholder should not be required to treat
as a "dividend" what is obviously a return of capital. This is exactly
what occurs where a corporation which has an accumulated aggregate
deficit makes a distribution in a year when it happens to have some
earnings. Moreover, since a postponement of the distribution to a year
in which there were no earnings, assuming the continuance of an aggre-
gate deficit, would convert the distribution from a "dividend" into a
return of capital, there is -no reason to penalize an acceleration of the
distribution.
2. The exclusion from the definition of "dividends" of distribu-
tions out of pre-I913 earnings has no sound foundation and the defini-
tion should be changed to make a distribution out of any earnings
taxable as a "dividend." The exemption of pre-19i3 earnings was
prompted, at least in part, by a mistaken conception by the Congress of
its constitutional powers.218  The House has thrice voted to repeal the
exemption, advancing adequate reasons therefor in its Ways and Means
Committee Reports; 217 but each time a recalcitrant Senate, without
giving any reason other than that the provision had been in the law for
many years, 215 has blocked reform.
In the case of a stockholder who acquired his stock prior to March
1, 1913, a plausible argument might be made in support of the exemp-
tion of distributions out of pre-1913 earnings on the ground that it is
the policy of the law to permit him to recoup the 1913 value of his stock
tax-free; 219 and, in theory at least, although rarely in fact, distribu-
tions out of pre-1913 earnings or pre-1913 increase in value, cannot
exceed the 1913 value of the stock.220 But certainly these considera-
tions do not apply to a stockholder who acquired his stock after 1913.
Moreover, even the pre-1913 shareholder should not be heard to corn-
215. Except as to companies, such as personal holding companies which are sub-
ject to surtax on account of non-distribution, and which may have taxable income and
earnings of the taxable year, but a deficit for past years. Even here, however, the
clause does not afford full escape, for such a company may have taxable net income
but no earnings for the taxable year. 'The writer has elsewhere advocated the taxa-
tion of stockholders of personal holding companies as partners. RUDICK, 10c. cit. jupra
note 1o9, at 22o. However, if such companies are to continue to be taxed as at
present, it would be better to supplant the last half of § 115 (a) by a provision similar
to that of § 351 (d) of the 1936 Act, whereby the personal holding company surtax
could be avoided if the stockholders included their pro-rata shares of the company
income in their individual returns.
216. See p. 867 supra.
217. E. g.. Ways and Mcans Committce Report, H. R. RE. No. 7o4, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) 15. See also SEam.axA, op. cit. supra note 25 at 536-537.
2r8. E. g., Senate Finance Committee Report, SE.;. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (936) 36.
219. If he were to sell his stock, his basis would be 1913 value, if that was above
cost.220. HOLLIES, FEDERA~l T4xES (6th ed. 1925) 8xo.
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plain if he is taxed on pre-1913 earnings distributed after that date,
when a stockholder who purchased stock in 1940 for $io,ooo and
received shortly thereafter, a $5,ooo dividend which depletes the value
of his stock by $5,ooo, is taxed on that amount.
221
The elimination of the exemption of pre-1913 earnings would
permit a substantial simplification of the provisions of Section 115.
Subsections (b) and (d) could be cut in half and most of the complex
provisions of subsections (I) and (in) could be excluded.
The continued exemption of unrealized increase in value is justified
because until actual realization, such increase is speculative and conjec-
tural. Furthermore, since it is now the clear policy of the law to ex-
clude distributions from realized but murecognized increases in value.
there is no sound reason for including distributions out of unrealized
appreciation. However, if the distinction between post-I9I3 and pre-
1913 earnings is to be obliterated, the corresponding distinction between
post-1913 increases in value and pre-1913 increase in value should also
be destroyed, so that distributions out of the latter source, if in excess
of basis, will become taxable. In fact, even if the line between earnings
before and after March I, 1913 is maintained, any excess of distribu-
tions out of pre-1913 appreciation should be made taxable.
3. In the light of the amendments to Section 115 made by the
Second Revenue Act of 1940, it seems possible to formulate a workable
concept of "earnings or profits." To begin with, it comprises actual
ijzcome and expenses, as distinguished from taxable income or deduct-
ible expenses. Next, it contemplates only realized 222 gains and losses
as distinguished from mere enhancement or decline in the value of
assets; subject to the limitation that there is added or detracted only that
portion of the realized gains or losses which is recognized (as distin-
gfished from taxed or allowed) in determining taxable net income. To
this extent and to the extent that the earnings of a corporation may
include the earnings of a predecessor corporation, taxable net income
and earnings or profits are integrated. This may mean that a particular
gain or loss is computed and that a particular distribution is character-
ized, not in accordance with good accounting practice, but in conformity
with wholly artificial precepts of tax law designed to protect the rev-
enue. However, save for these exceptions, the statutory scheme con-
templates that the determination of earnings or profits shall conform to
the best accounting practice.
2 23
221. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22 (a)-x; Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339
(917).
222. As indicated p. 903 supra, it seems reasonably clear that a distribution does
not effect realization.
223. Ways ard Means Committee Report, H. R. REP. No. 2894, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1939) 43.
